STATE OF NEW HAMPSHIRE
PUBLIC UTILITIES COMMISSION

DOCKET NO. DG 20-105

IN THE MATTER OF: LIBERTY UTILITIES (EnergyNorth Natural Gas)
CORP. d/b/a LIBERTY UTILITIES

DISTRIBUTION SERVICE RATE CASE

DIRECT TESTIMONY

OF

J. Randall Woolridge
CONSULTANT TO STAFF

March 18, 2021

Liberty Utilities
EnergyNorth Natural Gas Company
Docket No. DG 20-105
Direct Testimony of
Dr. J. Randall Woolridge

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1   I. **Introduction**

2   **Q. Please state your full name.**

3   A. My name is J. Randall Woolridge.

4

5   **Q. By whom are you employed and what is your business address?**

6   A. I am a Professor of Finance and the Goldman, Sachs & Co. and Frank P. Smeal

7   Endowed University Fellow in Business Administration at the University Park

8   Campus of Pennsylvania State University. I am also the Director of the Smeal

9   College Trading Room and President of the Nittany Lion Fund, LLC. A summary

10   of my educational background, research, and related business experience is

11   provided in Attachment JRW-1.

12

13   **Q. What is the purpose of your testimony in this proceeding?**

14   A. I have been asked by the Staff of the New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission to

15   provide an opinion as to the overall fair rate of return or cost of capital for the

16   regulated gas distribution service of Liberty Utilities (EnergyNorth Natural Gas)

17   Corp. d/b/a Liberty Utilities ("EnergyNorth" or the "Company") and to evaluate

18   EnergyNorth's rate of return testimony in this proceeding.

19

20   **Q. How is your testimony organized?**

21   A. First I will review my cost of capital recommendation for Liberty Utilities

22   (EnergyNorth), and review the primary areas of contention between EnergyNorth's

23   rate of return position and Staff's. Second, I provide an assessment of capital costs

1

1   in today's capital markets. Third, I discuss my proxy group of gas distribution

2   companies for estimating the cost of capital for EnergyNorth. Fourth, I present my

3   recommendations for the Company's capital structure and debt cost rate. Fifth, I

4   discuss the concept of the cost of equity capital, and then estimate the equity cost rate

5   for Liberty. Finally, I critique the Company's rate of return analysis and testimony.

6   I have a table of contents just after the title page for a more detailed outline.

7

8   **A. Overview**

9

10   **Q. What comprises a utility's "rate of return"?**

11   A. A company's overall rate of return consists of three main categories of inputs: (1)

12   capital structure (i.e., ratios of short-term debt, long-term debt, preferred stock,

13   and common equity); (2) cost rates for short-term debt, long-term debt, and

14   preferred stock; and (3) common equity cost, otherwise known as Return on Equity

15   ("ROE").

16

17   **Q. What is a utility's ROE intended to reflect?**

18   A. An ROE is most simply described as the allowed rate of profit for a regulated

19   company. In a competitive market, a company's profit level is determined by a

20   variety of factors, including the state of the economy, the degree of competition a

21   company faces, the ease of entry into its markets, the existence of substitute or

22   complementary products/services, the company's cost structure, the impact of

23   technological changes, and the supply and demand for its services and/or products.

2

1   For a regulated monopoly, the regulator determines the level of profit available to

2   the utility. The United States Supreme Court established the guiding principles

3   for establishing an appropriate level of profitability for regulated public utilities in

4   two cases: (1) *Bluefield* and (2) *Hope*.[1] In those cases, the Court recognized that

5   the fair rate of return on equity should be: (1) comparable to returns investors

6   expect to earn on other investments of similar risk; (2) sufficient to assure

7   confidence in the company's financial integrity; and (3) adequate to maintain and

8   support the company's credit and to attract capital.

9   Thus, the appropriate ROE for a regulated utility requires determining the

10   market-based cost of capital. The market-based cost of capital for a regulated firm

11   represents the return investors could expect from other investments, while

12   assuming no more and no less risk. The purpose of all of the economic models

13   and formulas in cost of capital testimony (including those presented later in my

14   testimony) is to estimate, using market data of similar-risk firms, the rate of return

15   equity investors require for that risk-class of firms in order to set an appropriate

16   ROE for a regulated firm.

17

18   **Q. Please review the company's proposed rate of return.**

19   A. The Company has proposed a hypothetical capital structure of 49.85% debt and

20   50.15% common equity. The Company has recommended a debt cost rate of

---

[1]   *Federal Power Commission v. Hope Natural Gas Co.*, 320 U.S. 591 (1944) ("*Hope*") and *Bluefield Water Works and Improvement Co. v. Public Service Commission of West Virginia*, 262 U.S. 679 (1923) ("*Bluefield*").

3

1   4.42%. EnergyNorth witness Mr. John Cochrane has recommended a common

2   equity cost rate of 10.51% for the gas distribution operations of EnergyNorth. The

3   Company's overall proposed rate of return is 7.47%. This is summarized in Table

4   1.

5   **Table 1**
6   **EnergyNorth Recommended Cost of Capital**

Capital Source	Capitalization Ratios	Cost Rate	Weighted Cost Rate
Long-Term Debt	**49.85%**	**4.42%**	**2.20%**
Common Equity	**50.15%**	**10.51%**	**5.27%**
Total Capital	**100.00%**		**7.47%**

7

8   **Q. What are your recommendations regarding the appropriate rate of return for**

9   **EnergyNorth?**

10   A. I have reviewed the Company's proposed hypothetical capital structure and overall

11   cost of capital. The Company's proposed capital structure has less debt and more

12   equity than other gas companies. As a result, I am employing a capital structure

13   with a common equity ratio of 49.21% which was approved in the Company's last

14   rate case. To estimate an equity cost rate for the Company, I have applied the

15   Discounted Cash Flow Model ("DCF") and the Capital Asset Pricing Model

16   ("CAPM") to my proxy group of gas distribution companies ("Gas Proxy Group").

17   My recommendation is that the appropriate ROE for the Company is 9.00%. This

18   figure is at the upper end of my equity cost rate range of 7.6% to 9.00%. Combined

19   with my recommended capitalization ratios and senior capital cost rate, my overall

20   rate of return or cost of capital for the Company is 6.67% as summarized in Table

21   2 and Attachment JRW-2.

1   **Table 2**
2   **Staff Recommended Cost of Capital**

Capital Source	Capitalization Ratios	Cost Rate	Weighted Cost Rate
Total Debt	50.79%	4.42%	2.24%
Common Equity	49.21%	9.00%	4.43%
Total Capital	100.00%		6.67%

3
4

5   **B. Primary Rate of Return Issues in this Case**

6

7   Q. **Please summarize the primary issues regarding rate of return in this**

8   **proceeding.**

9   A. The primary rate of return issues in this case include the following:

10   Capital Structure - The Company has proposed a capital structure that includes a

11   common equity ratio (50.15%) that is higher than the average common equity

12   ratios employed by the proxy group. Hence, as a result, I am employing a capital

13   structure with a common equity ratio of 49.21% which was approved in the

14   Company's last rate case.

15   DCF Approach – Mr. Cochrane and I have both employed the traditional constant-

16   growth DCF model. Mr. Cochrane has also used a multi-stage growth version of

17   the model. There are several errors in Mr. Cochrane's DCF analyses: (1) he has

18   exclusively used the overly optimistic and upwardly biased earnings per share

19   ("EPS") growth rate forecasts of Wall Street analysts and *Value Line*; (2) he has

20   combined abnormally high *Value Line* projected EPSs for his proxy companies,

21   computed from a three-year base period, with three-to-five-year projected growth

22   rates of Yahoo and Zack's; and (3) his terminal growth rate of 5.17% in his multi-

5

1   stage DCF model is inflated, does not reflect the prospective economic growth in

2   the U.S., and is about 100 basis points above the projected long-term GDP growth.

3   On the other hand, when developing the DCF growth rate that I have used in my

4   analysis, I have reviewed thirteen growth rate measures including historical and

5   projected growth rate measures and have evaluated growth in dividends, book

6   value, and earnings per share.

7   CAPM Approach – The CAPM approach requires an estimate of the risk-free

8   interest rate, beta, and the market or risk premium. There are several issues with

9   Mr. Cochrane's overstated market risk premium of 12.19%. First, the 12.19%

10   market risk premium is much larger than: (1) indicated by historic stock and bond

11   return data; and (2) found in the published studies and surveys of the market risk

12   premium. Second, the 12.19% market risk premium is based on unrealistic

13   assumptions of future economic and earnings growth and stock returns. To

14   compute his market risk premium, Mr. Cochrane has applied the DCF to the S&P

15   500 and employed analysts' three-to-five-year EPS growth-rate projections as a

16   growth rate to compute an expected market return and market risk premiums As

17   I demonstrate later in my testimony, the EPS growth-rate projection of 11.45%

18   used for the S&P 500 and the resulting expected market return and market risk

19   premium include unrealistic assumptions regarding future economic and earnings

20   growth and stock returns.

21   As I highlight in my testimony, there are three procedures for estimating a

22   market risk premium – historic returns, surveys, and expected return models. I

23   have used a market risk premium of 6.00%, which: (1) factors in all three

6

1   approaches – historic returns, surveys, and expected return models – to estimate a

2   market premium; and (2) employs the results of many studies of the market risk

3   premium. As I note, the 6.00% figure reflects the market risk premiums: (1)

4   determined in recent academic studies by leading finance scholars; (2) employed

5   by leading investment banks and management consulting firms; and (3) found in

6   surveys of companies, financial forecasters, financial analysts, and corporate

7   CFOs.

8   Flotation Costs - Mr. Cochrane's recommendation includes an adjustment of

9   0.11% for equity flotation costs. Yet, Mr. Cochrane has not identified any flotation

10   costs that have been paid by EnergyNorth. Therefore, the Company should not be

11   rewarded with a higher ROE that includes flotation costs when the Company has

12   not paid any such costs. Furthermore, the Commission has traditionally not

13   allowed flotation costs.

14   Company Size – Mr. Cochrane's ROE recommendation also includes a

15   consideration of a size premium for the Company. However, as I show, any such

16   premiums for size is not appropriate for a regulated public utility. In addition, the

17   Commission has traditionally not allowed a size premium.

18
19
20   **II. Capital Market Conditions and Authorized ROEs**

            A. Capital Market Conditions

21   **Q. Please provide a summary of the utility capital market indicators in**

22   **Attachment JRW-3**

23   A. Page 1 of Attachment JRW-3 shows the yields on A rated public utility bonds.

1   These yields declined with interest rates in general in the year 2019, and in 2020

2   they further declined, bottomed out in the 2.5% range, and have recovered to about

3   3.5% in 2021.

4   The average dividend yield for gas companies is shown on page 2 of

5   Attachment JRW-3. These yields declined over the last decade, bottoming out at

6   2.7% in 2017. They increased in the past year and now are at 3.2%. Page 2 of

7   Attachment JRW-3 shows that the average dividend yield for publicly-held gas

8   companies is just above 3.0% as of year-end 2020. The average earned ROE and

9   market-to-book ratio for publicly-held gas companies as of year-end 2020 are

10   shown on page 3 of Attachment JRW-3. The average ROE for gas companies has

11   been in the range of 8.0%-9.0% in recent years, while the average market-to-book

12   ratio reached 2.25X in 2019, but has fallen to 1.75X in 2020.

13

14   **Q. Please review the financial markets in 2020.**

15   A. The financial markets began the year 2020 in good form – stock prices rose about

16   five percent in the first six weeks of the year and interest rates declined. Then came

17   weeks of chaos.   In the middle of February 2020, the spread of the novel

18   coronavirus went global and the virus became a major risk factor for the world's

19   population and global economy. From mid-February until the third week of March,

20   the S&P 500 declined 35 percent and investors fled to low-risk financial assets,

21   most notably long-term Treasury bonds. The yield on the benchmark 30-year

22   Treasury bond declined from 2.0 percent and traded as low as 1.25 percent, an all-

23   time low. Furthermore, the day-to-day volatility of prices in financial markets was

1   at extremes. The VIX, which is the CBOE volatility index and which is also known

2   as Wall Street's Fear Index, increased from 15 and traded over 50, a level which

3   has not been seen since the financial crisis in 2008.

4   In response, the federal government took unprecedented fiscal and monetary

5   actions to support the economy and financial markets. Congress passed and

6   President Trump signed a $2 trillion Covid-19 stimulus relief package to help

7   American families and businesses, the biggest economic rescue package in modern

8   American history. The package granted households relief in the form of stimulus

9   checks sent directly to most Americans, expanded unemployment benefits,

10   expanded paid sick leave, provided temporary student debt relief and more. The

11   Federal Reserve lowered the target range for its benchmark federal funds rate to

12   the current range of 0% to 0.25%, which target range it expects to maintain until

13   the economy has recovered. In addition, the Federal Reserve implemented a broad

14   range of unprecedented programs to support financial market liquidity and

15   economic stability. These included financial asset purchases and the creation of

16   credit facilities to support households, businesses, and state and local

17   governments.

18   In 2021, with the new administration and with the Democrats controlling both

19   the Senate and the House, President Biden signed a second $1.9 trillion Covid-19

20   stimulus plan which include $1,400 checks for 1,400 for individuals, billions to

21   help schools and colleges reopen, funding for vaccine distribution, and many other

22   financial resources to help the U.S. recover from the pandemic.

9

1 **Q. Please review the impact of the economy on interest rates.**

2 A. Figure 2 shows 30-year Treasury yields over the past two years (2019-21). These yields

3 were in the 3.0% range at the end of 2018. These yields declined to the 2.25% range

4 in 2019 due primarily to slow economic growth and low inflation. As noted, in 2020,

5 with the advent of the Covid-19 pandemic in February, 30-year Treasury yields

6 declined to record low levels, declining about 100 basis points to the 1.25% range.

7 They began their recovery in the summer of 2020 and have increased approximately to

8 the 2.25% range in 2021. Despite their recovery, these rates are still at historically low

9 levels.

10 **Figure 2**
11 **30-Year Treasury Yields**

13 Data Source: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/series/DGS30

15 **Q. Have utilities taken advantage of the lower bond yields to raise capital?**

16 A. Yes. Figure 3 shows the annual amounts of debt and equity capital raised by public

17 utility companies over the past decade. Electric utility and gas distribution

18 companies have taken advantage of the low interest rate and capital cost

19 environment of recent years and raised record amounts of capital in the markets.

1   In fact, in each of the last three years, public utilities have raised a total of over

2    $100 billion in debt and

3
4   **Figure 3**
5   **Debt and Equity Capital Raised by Public Utilities**
6   **2010-20**

7
8   Source: S&P Global Market Intelligence, S&P Cap IQ, 2020.
9
10
11   **Q. Please discuss the increase in interest rates since the middle of 2020.**

12   A. As noted, with the economy improving and the passage of the second Covid-19

13   stimulus plan, interest rates increase about 100 basis points since mid-2020. The

14   increase in rates reflect the prospect that expanded economic growth could lead to

15   higher inflation. Investors' inflation expectation can be seen by looking at the

16   difference between yields on ordinary Treasuries and the yields on inflation-

17   protected Treasuries, known as TIPS. Panel A of Figure 4 shows the expected

18   inflation rate over the next five years. You can see the big increase over the past

19   year, with an expected inflation rate of 2.45% over the next five years. Panels B

20   and C of Figure 4 shows the expected inflation rate over the next ten and thirty

1   years. The expected inflation rates over the next ten and thirty years are 2.24% and

2   2.18%. When the expected inflation rate is higher over five years than over ten and

3   thirty years, as is the case now, it is known as a bond-market inversion and it

4   reflects that, despite a short-term expectation of higher inflation, the long-term

5   inflation rate is still just above 2.0%.[2]

6   **Figure 4**
7   **Panel A**
8   **5-Year Treasury Yields Minus 5-Year Treasury TIPs**

9

10   **Panel B**
11   **10-Year Treasury Yields Minus 10-Year Treasury TIPs**

12
13
14

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[2]   Paul J. Davies – "Rare Bond-Market Inversion Signals Short-Lived Boost to Inflation," *Wall Street Journal*, February 25, 2021.

1   **Panel C**
2   **30-Year Treasury Yields Minus 30-Year Treasury TIPs**

3
4   Date Source: https://fred.stlouisfed.org/

5

6   **Q. How has the change in interest rates over the past year impacted capital costs**

7   **for utilities?**

8   A. As discusses below, with Covid-19 and the record low interest rates in 2020,

9   authorized ROEs for utilities also reached record low levels in 2020. However,

10   whereas interest rates declined by about 100 basis points in 2020, authorized ROEs

11   only declined by about 25 basis points. Therefore, utility ROEs never declined to

12   the extent that interest rates declined in 2020.

13   **Q. Please summarize your assessment of the current capital market situation.**

14a. The U.S. economy, which declined nearly twenty percent in the first half of 2020,

15   rebounded significantly in the second half of 2020, resulting in a 3.5% GDP

16   decline for the year. The U.S. unemployment rate peaked in the second quarter of

17   2020 at about 15% and is now back to 6.5%. The stock market began its recovery

18   in the third week of March of 2020. And despite the ongoing spread of COVID-

13

1   19 and an economic crisis created by the virus that included record unemployment,

2   the S&P 500 has come back strong and is now back at record levels. The 30-year

3   Treasury yield, which dropped to record low levels and has come back to its pre-

4   Covid levels. And the markets "fear index," the VIX, which topped out over 50, is

5   now near its long-time average of 20.[3]

B. Authorized ROEs

6

7   **Q. Please discuss the trend in authorized roes for electric and gas companies.**

8   A. In Figure 4, I have graphed the quarterly authorized ROEs for electric and gas

9   companies from 2000 to 2020. Over the years, as interest rates have come down,

10   authorized ROEs for electric utility and gas distribution companies have slowly

11   declined to reflect a low capital cost environment. In 2020, authorized ROEs for

12   utilities hit an all-time low. On an annual basis, the authorized ROEs for gas

13   distribution companies have been 9.94% in 2012, 9.68% in 2013, 9.78% in 2014,

14   9.60% in 2015, 9.50% in 2016, 9.72% in 2017, 9.59% in 2018, 9.71% in 2019,

15   and 9.46% in 2020, according to Regulatory Research Associates. On an annual

16   basis, the average authorized ROEs for electric utilities have been an average of

17   10.01% in 2012, 9.8% in 2013, 9.76% in 2014, 9.58% in 2015, 9.60% in 2016,

---

[3]   The Chicago Board Options Exchange Volatility Index, or **VIX**, is a real-time market index representing the market's expectations for volatility over the coming 30 days. Investors use the VIX to measure the level of risk, fear, or stress in the market when making investment decisions.

14

1   9.68% in 2017, 9.56% in 2018, 9.65% in of 2019, and 9.39% in 2020, according

2   to Regulatory Research Associates.[4]

3   **Figure 4**
4   **Authorized ROEs for Gas Utility and Gas Distribution Companies**
5   **2000-2020**

6
7

8   **Q. Please review the authorized ROEs in New Hampshire.**

9   A. I reviewed this relationship in Figure 5, in which I show (1) the authorized ROEs

10   in New Hampshire for electric utility and gas distribution companies and (2) 30-

11   year Treasury yields, since 2010. Between 2013 and 2018, the authorized ROEs

12   in New Hampshire were in the 9.4%-9.5% range, while the 30-year Treasury yield

13   averaged 3.0%. Over the 2019-21 period, the yield on 30-year Treasury bonds

14   declined from 3.0% to as low as about 1.0% during the pandemic, and now is in

15   the 2.0% range. The lower capital costs in the 2020-1 time were reflected in the

16   authorized electric and gas ROEs in New Hampshire, as ROEs declined to the

17   9.10%-9.30% range.

18

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[4]   S&P Global Market Intelligence, RRA *Regulatory Focus*, 2021.

15

Figure 5
30-Year Treasury Yields and New Hampshire
Electric and Gas Authorized ROEs
2010-2021

7 Q. **Do you believe that your ROE recommendation meets *Hope* and *Bluefield***

8 **standards?**

9 A. Yes, I do. As previously noted, according to the *Hope* and *Bluefield* decisions,

10 returns on capital should be: (1) comparable to returns investors expect to earn on

11 other investments of similar risk; (2) sufficient to assure confidence in the

12 company's financial integrity; and (3) adequate to maintain and support the

13 company's credit and to attract capital. As shown on page 3 of Attachment JRW-

14 3, gas distribution companies have been earning ROEs in the range of 8.0% to

15 9.0% in recent years. With such a ROE, gas companies such as those in the proxy

16 group have strong investment grade credit ratings, their stocks have been selling

17 at almost 2.0 times book value, and they have been raising abundant amounts of

18 capital. While my recommendation is below the average authorized ROEs for gas

16

1   distribution companies, it reflects the record low levels of interest rates and capital

2   costs. Therefore, I believe that my ROE recommendation meets the criteria

3   established in the *Hope* and *Bluefield* decisions.

4

5   **III.   Proxy Group Selection**

6

7   **Q. Please describe your approach to developing a fair rate of return**

8   **recommendation for EnergyNorth.**

9   A. To develop a fair rate of return recommendation for the Company (market cost of

10   equity), I evaluated the return requirements of investors on the common stock of

11   a proxy group of nine publicly held gas distribution companies ("the Gas Proxy

12   Group"). The Gas Proxy Group consists of nine natural gas distribution companies

13   listed by *Value Line* in the Natural Gas Company industry group: Atmos Energy,

14   Chesapeake Utilities, Inc., New Jersey Resources, NiSource, Northwest Natural

15   Holding Company, One Gas, Inc., South Jersey Industries, Southwest Gas

16   Corporation, and Spire, Inc.

17

18   **Q. How does your group compare to Mr. Cochrane's group of gas distribution**

19   **companies?**

20   A. Mr. Cochrane has excluded Northwest Natural Gas from the group of gas

21   distribution companies covered by *Value Line*. Mr. Cochrane excludes companies

22   that receive less than 60 percent of operating income from regulated operations.

23   Given the low number of available gas companies, I do not believe that Northwest

1   Natural Gas should be eliminated. Otherwise, the two proxy groups are the same.

2

3   **Q. Please discuss the financial statistics for your proxy group.**

4   A. On page 1 of Attachment JRW-4, I list the summary financial statistics for the Gas

5   Proxy Group. The median operating revenues and net plant among members of

6   the Gas Proxy Group are $1,952.4 million and $4,599.4 million, respectively. On

7   average, the group receives 70 percent of revenues from regulated gas operations,

8   has an BBB+ average issuer credit rating from S&P, an average common equity

9   ratio of 45.8 percent, and an average earned return on common equity of 8.7

10   percent.

11

12   **Q. What role do bond ratings play in the investment community?**

13   A. I believe that bond ratings provide a good independent assessment of the

14   investment risk of a company.

15

16   **Q. How does the investment risk of the Company compare to that of your gas**

17   **group?**

18   A. As shown in Attachment JRW-4, the average S&P and Moody's issuer credit

19   rating for the gas group is BBB+ and Baa1. EnergyNorth is not rated by any rating

20   agencies. EnergyNorth's ultimate parent, Algonquin Power Company (APUC), is

21   rated BBB by S&P.[5] APUC owns Algonquin Power Company, an independent

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[5]   Standard & Poor's Rating Services, Algonquin Power & Utilities Corp., January 2, 2019.

18

1   power producer, as well as Liberty Utilities (LU) which is EnergyNorth's direct

2   parent company. As indicated in a S&P report, APUC's credit rating benefits from

3   the low-risk, rate regulated utility business LU. APUC and LU are also rated by

4   DBRS Limited, primarily a credit agency for Canadian companies. The DBRS

5   ratings for APUC and LU are BBB (high). Overall, these credit ratings suggest

6   that EnergyNorth is at the higher end of the investment risk spectrum of the proxy

7   group. However, APUC's unregulated power business, acquisitions, and more

8   highly-levered balance sheet would impact these ratings in a negative way, while

9   the regulated EnergyNorth operations provide a positive influence on the ratings.

10

11   Q. **Please discuss the investment risk of the gas proxy group as measured by the**

12   **risk metrics published by *Value Line*.**

13   A. On page 2 of Attachment JRW-4, I show the riskiness of the Gas Proxy Group

14   using five different risk measures from *Value Line*. The mean values of these

15   various risk measures are : (1) Beta (0.87); (2) Financial Strength (A); (3) Safety

16   (2.0); (4) Earnings Predictability (67); and (5) Stock Price Stability (87).[6] In my

17   opinion, these risk measures indicate that the group's investment risk is relatively

18   low.

19

20

---

[6]   These metrics are defined on page 3 of Attachment JRW-4.

1   **IV.**   **Capital Structure Ratios and Debt Cost Rate**

2

3   **Q. Please describe EnergyNorth's proposed capital structure and debt cost rate.**

4   A. The Company has proposed a capital structure of 49.50% debt and 50.50%

5   common equity and a long-term debt cost rate of 4.42%. This is summarized in

6   Panel A of Attachment JRW-5.

7

8   **Q. What are the average common equity ratios in the capitalizations of the proxy**

9   **group?**

10   A. As shown in Attachment JRW-4, p. 1, the mean common equity ratio for the

11   companies in the Gas Proxy Group is 45.8%. This indicates that the Company's

12   proposed capitalization has a higher common equity ratio than the proxy group. It

13   should be noted that the capitalization ratios of the proxy groups include total debt

14   which consists of both short-term and long-term debt.

15

16   **Q. Is it more appropriate to use the common equity ratios of the parent holding**

17   **companies or the subsidiary operating utilities when comparing to the**

18   **Company's proposed capitalization?**

19   A. It is more appropriate to use the common equity ratios of the utility holding

20   companies because the holding companies are publicly-traded and their stocks are

21   used in the cost of equity capital studies. The equities of the operating utilities are

22   not publicly-traded and hence their stocks cannot be used to compute the cost of

23   equity capital for EnergyNorth.

1   **Q. Is it appropriate to include short-term debt in the capitalization when**

2   **comparing the common equity ratios of the holding companies to the**

3   **Company's proposed capitalization?**

4   A. Yes. In comparing the common equity ratios of the holding companies to the

5   Company's recommendation, it is appropriate to include short-term debt when

6   computing the holding company common equity ratios. That is because short-term

7   debt, like long-term debt, has a higher claim on the assets and earnings of the

8   company and requires timely payment of interest and repayment of principal. In

9   addition, the financial risk of a company is based on total debt, which includes both

10 short-term and long-term debt. This is why credit rating agencies use total debt in

11 assessing the leverage and financial risk of companies.

12

13 **Q. Given that the Company's proposed capitalization has a higher common**

14 **equity ratio than the average common equity ratios employed by the proxy**

15 **group, what capital structure and debt cost rate are you recommending for**

16 **EnergyNorth?**

17 A. I am recommending a capital structure with a common equity ratio of 49.21%

18 which was the capital structure approved in the Company's last rate case.[7] The

19 Company has not demonstrated that it has been unable to attract capital with this

20 capitalization. I will use the Company's proposed debt cost rate of 4.42%.

21 **Q. On pages 39-40 of his testimony and in Attachment JC-12, Mr. Cochrane**

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[7]   State of New Hampshire Public Utilities Commission, Order No. 26,122, April 27, 2018, p. 41.

1   **defends the Company's proposed capitalization. Please respond.**

2   A.   Mr. Cochrane justifies the Company's proposed capital structure by computing the

3   average common equity ratios for his proxy group using data from *Value Line*.

4   The big issue is that he excludes short-term debt when measuring the common

5   equity ratios. As discussed above, when assessing financial risk and computing a

6   common equity ratio, it is appropriate to include short-term debt. As noted, short-

7   term debt, like long-term debt, has a higher claim on the assets and earnings of the

8   company and requires timely payment of interest and repayment of principal.

9   Therefore, the financial risk of a company is based on total debt, which includes both

10   short-term and long-term debt. This is why credit rating agencies use total debt in

11   assessing the leverage and financial risk of companies.

12

13   **V.   The Cost of Common Equity Capital**

14   **A.   Overview**

15   Q.   **Why must an overall cost of capital or fair rate of return be established for a**

16   **public utility?**

17   A.   In a competitive industry, the return on a firm's common equity capital is

18   determined through the competitive market for its goods and services. Due to the

19   capital requirements needed to provide utility services and the economic benefit

20   to society from avoiding duplication of these services and the construction of

21   utility infrastructure facilities, many public utilities are monopolies. Because of

22   the lack of competition and the essential nature of their services, it is not

23   appropriate to permit monopoly utilities to set their own prices. Thus, regulation

1   seeks to establish prices that are fair to consumers and, at the same time, sufficient

2   to meet the operating and capital costs of the utility, *i.e.*, provide an adequate return

3   on capital to attract investors.

4

5 **Q. Please provide an overview of the cost of capital in the context of the theory**

6   **of the firm.**

7 A. The total cost of operating a business includes the cost of capital. The cost of

8   common equity capital is the expected return on a firm's common stock that the

9   marginal investor would deem sufficient to compensate for risk and the time value

10   of money.   In equilibrium, the expected and required rates of return on a

11   company's common stock are equal.

12   Normative economic models of a company or firm, developed under very

13   restrictive assumptions, provide insight into the relationship between a firm's

14   performance or profitability, capital costs, and the value of the firm. Under the

15   economist's ideal model of perfect competition, where entry and exit are costless,

16   products are undifferentiated, and there are increasing marginal costs of

17   production, firms produce up to the point where price equals marginal cost. Over

18   time, a long-run equilibrium is established where the product price equals the

19   average cost, including the firm's capital costs. In equilibrium, total revenues

20   equal total costs, and because capital costs represent investors' required return on

21   the firm's capital, actual returns equal required returns, and the market value must

22   equal the book value of the firm's securities.

1   In a competitive market, firms can achieve competitive advantage due to

2   product-market imperfections. Most notably, companies can gain competitive

3   advantage through product differentiation (adding real or perceived value to

4   products) and by achieving economies of scale (decreasing marginal costs of

5   production). Competitive advantage allows firms to price products above average

6   cost and thereby earn accounting profits greater than those required to cover capital

7   costs. When these profits are in excess of those required by investors, or when a

8   firm earns a return on equity in excess of its cost of equity, investors respond by

9   valuing the firm's equity in excess of its book value.

10   James M. McTaggart, founder of the international management consulting

11   firm Marakon Associates, Inc., described this essential relationship between the

12   return on equity, the cost of equity, and the market-to-book ratio in the following

13   manner:

14   Fundamentally, the value of a company is determined by the cash
15   flow it generates over time for its owners, and the minimum
16   acceptable rate of return required by capital investors. This "cost of
17   equity capital" is used to discount the expected equity cash flow,
18   converting it to a present value. The cash flow is, in turn, produced
19   by the interaction of a company's return on equity and the annual
20   rate of equity growth. High return on equity (ROE) companies in
21   low-growth markets, such as Kellogg, are prodigious generators of
22   cash flow, while low ROE companies in high-growth markets, such
23   as Texas Instruments, barely generate enough cash flow to finance
24   growth.

25   A company's ROE over time, relative to its cost of equity, also
26   determines whether it is worth more or less than its book value. If
27   its ROE is consistently greater than the cost of equity capital (the
28   investor's minimum acceptable return), the business is economically
29   profitable and its market value will exceed book value. If, however,
30   the business earns an ROE consistently less than its cost of equity,

24

1   it is economically unprofitable and its market value will be less than
2   book value. [8]

3   As such, the relationship between a firm's return on equity, cost of equity, and

4   market-to-book ratio is relatively straightforward. A firm that earns a return on

5   equity above its cost of equity will see its common stock sell at a price above its

6   book value. Conversely, a firm that earns a return on equity below its cost of

7   equity will see its common stock sell at a price below its book value.

8

9   **Q. Please provide additional insights into the relationship between ROE and**

10   **market-to-book ratios.**

11   A. This relationship is discussed in a classic Harvard Business School case study

12   entitled "Note on Value Drivers." On page 2 of that case study, the author

13   describes the relationship very succinctly:

14   For a given industry, more profitable firms – those able to generate
15   higher returns per dollar of equity – should have higher market-to-
16   book ratios. Conversely, firms which are unable to generate returns
17   in excess of their cost of equity [(K)] should sell for less than book
18   value.

19
20   *Profitability*   *Value*
21   *If ROE > K*   then Market/Book > 1
22   *If ROE = K*   then Market/Book =1
23   *If ROE < K*   then Market/Book< 1*[9]*
24

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[8]   James M. McTaggart, "The Ultimate Poison Pill: Closing the Value Gap," *Commentary* (Spring 1986), p.3.

[9]   Benjamin Esty, "Note on Value Drivers," Harvard Business School, Case No. 9-297-082, April 7, 1997.

1   To assess the relationship by industry, as suggested above, I performed a

2   regression study between estimated ROE and market-to-book ratios using natural

3   gas distribution and electric utility companies. I used all companies in these two

4   industries that are covered by *Value Line* and have estimated ROE and market-to-

5   book ratio data. The results are presented in Attachment JRW-6. The average R-

6   square is 0.50.[10]   This demonstrates the statistically-significant positive

7   relationship between ROEs and market-to-book ratios for public utilities. Given

8   that the market-to-book ratios have been above 1.0 for a number of years, this also

9   demonstrates that utilities have been earning ROEs above the cost of equity capital

10   for many years.

11

12   **Q. What factors determine investors' expected or required rate of return on**

13   **equity?**

14   A. The expected or required rate of return on common stock is a function of

15   market-wide as well as company-specific factors. The most important market

16   factor is the time value of money, as indicated by the level of interest rates in the

17   economy. Common stock investor requirements generally increase and decrease

18   with like changes in interest rates. The perceived risk of a firm is the predominant

19   factor that influences investor return requirements on a company-specific basis. A

20   firm's investment risk is often separated into business risk and financial risk.

---

[10]   R-square measures the percent of variation in one variable (e.g., market-to-book ratios) explained
       by another variable (e.g., expected ROE). R-squares vary between zero and 1.0, with values closer
       to 1.0 indicating a higher relationship between two variables.

1   Business risk encompasses all factors that affect a firm's operating revenues and

2   expenses. Financial risk results from incurring fixed obligations in the form of

3   debt in financing its assets.

4

5 Q. **How does the investment risk of utilities compare with that of other**

6   **industries?**

7 A. Due to the essential nature of their service as well as their regulated status, public

8   utilities are exposed to a lesser degree of business risk than other, non-regulated

9   businesses. The relatively low level of business risk allows public utilities to meet

10   much of their capital requirements through borrowing in the financial markets.

11   Nonetheless, the overall investment risk of public utilities is below most other

12   industries.

13   Page 2 of Attachment JRW-6 provides an assessment of investment risk for 94

14   industries as measured by beta, which, according to modern capital market theory,

15   is the only relevant measure of investment risk. These betas come from the *Value*

16   *Line Investment Survey*. The study shows that the investment risk of utilities is

17   low compared to other industries. The average betas for electric, gas, and water

18   utility companies are 0.89, 0.89, and 0.79, respectively.[11] As such, the cost of

19   equity for utilities is the lowest of all industries in the U.S., based on modern

20   capital market theory.

21

---

[11]   The beta for the *Value Line* electric utilities is the simple average of *Value Line*'s Electric East
      (0.89), Central (0.89), and West (0.90) group betas.

1   **Q. What is the cost of common equity capital?**

2   A. The costs of debt and preferred stock are normally based on historical or book

3   values and can be determined with a great degree of accuracy. The cost of

4   common equity capital, however, cannot be determined precisely and must instead

5   be estimated from market data and informed judgment. This return requirement

6   of the stockholder should be commensurate with the return requirement on

7   investments in other enterprises having comparable risks.

8   According to valuation principles, the present value of an asset equals the

9   discounted value of its expected future cash flows. Investors discount these

10   expected cash flows at their required rate of return that, as noted above, reflects

11   the time value of money and the perceived riskiness of the expected future cash

12   flows. As such, the cost of common equity is the rate at which investors discount

13   expected cash flows associated with common stock ownership.

14

15   **Q. How can the expected or required rate of return on common equity capital**

16   **be determined?**

17   A. Models have been developed to ascertain the cost of common equity capital for a

18   firm. Each model, however, has been developed using restrictive economic

19   assumptions. Consequently, judgment is required in selecting appropriate

20   financial valuation models to estimate a firm's cost of common equity capital, in

21   determining the data inputs for these models, and in interpreting the models'

22   results. All of these decisions must take into consideration the firm involved as

23   well as current conditions in the economy and the financial markets.

28

1

2   **Q.** **How did you estimate the cost of equity capital for the Company?**

3   A. Primarily, I rely on the DCF model to estimate the cost of equity capital. Given

4   the investment valuation process and the relative stability of the utility business,

5   the DCF model provides the best measure of equity cost rates for public utilities.

6   I have also performed a CAPM study; however, I give these results less weight

7   because I believe that risk premium studies, of which the CAPM is one form,

8   provide a less reliable indication of equity cost rates for public utilities.

9

10 **Q.** **Please explain why you believe that the CAPM provides a less reliable**

11   **indicator of equity cost rates?**

     A. I believe that the CAPM provides a less reliable measure of a utility's equity cost

       rate because it requires an estimate of the market risk premium. As discussed

       below, there is a wide variation in estimates of the market risk premium found in

       studies by academics and investment firms as well as in surveys of market

       professionals.

12   **B. DCF Approach**

13

14 **Q.** **Please describe the theory behind the traditional DCF model.**

15 A. According to the DCF model, the current stock price is equal to the discounted

16   value of all future dividends that investors expect to receive from investment in

17   the firm. As such, stockholders' returns ultimately result from current as well as

29

000032

1   future dividends. As owners of a corporation, common stockholders are entitled

2   to a *pro rata* share of the firm's earnings. The DCF model presumes that earnings

3   that are not paid out in the form of dividends are reinvested in the firm so as to

4   provide for future growth in earnings and dividends. The rate at which investors

5   discount future dividends, which reflects the timing and riskiness of the expected

6   cash flows, is interpreted as the market's expected or required return on the

7   common stock. Therefore, this discount rate represents the cost of common equity.

8   Algebraically, the DCF model can be expressed as:

9
$$P = \frac{D_1}{(1+k)^1} + \frac{D_2}{(1+k)^2} + \cdots + \frac{D_n}{(1+k)^n}$$

10

11 where P is the current stock price, D_n is the dividend in year n, and k is the cost of

12 common equity.

13 **Q. Is the DCF model consistent with valuation techniques employed by**

14 **investment firms?**

15 A. Yes. Virtually all investment firms use some form of the DCF model as a valuation

16 technique. One common application for investment firms is called the three-stage

17 DCF or dividend discount model ("DDM"). The stages in a three-stage DCF

18 model are presented on page 3 of Attachment JRW-6. This model presumes that

19 a company's dividend payout progresses initially through a growth stage, then

20 proceeds through a transition stage, and finally assumes a maturity (or steady-

21 state) stage. The dividend-payment stage of a firm depends on the profitability of

22 its internal investments which, in turn, is largely a function of the life cycle of the

23 product or service.

1   1.   Growth stage: Characterized by rapidly expanding sales, high profit

2 margins, and an abnormally high growth in earnings per share. Because of highly

3 profitable expected investment opportunities, the payout ratio is low. Competitors

4 are attracted by the unusually high earnings, leading to a decline in the growth rate.

5   2.   Transition stage: In later years, increased competition reduces profit

6 margins and earnings growth slows. With fewer new investment opportunities,

7 the company begins to pay out a larger percentage of earnings.

8   3.   Maturity (steady-state) stage: Eventually, the company reaches a

9 position where its new investment opportunities offer, on average, only slightly

10 attractive ROEs. At that time, its earnings growth rate, payout ratio, and ROE

11 stabilize for the remainder of its life.

12   The constant-growth DCF model is appropriate when a firm is in the maturity

13 stage of the life cycle. In using this model to estimate a firm's cost of equity

14 capital, dividends are projected into the future using the different growth rates in

15 the alternative stages, and then the equity cost rate is the discount rate that equates

16 the present value of the future dividends to the current stock price.

17 **Q. How do you estimate stockholders' expected or required rate of return using**

18 **the DCF model?**

19 A. Under certain assumptions, including a constant and infinite expected growth rate,

20 and constant dividend/earnings and price/earnings ratios, the DCF model can be

21 simplified to the following:

22

1
$$P = \frac{D_1}{k - g}$$

2

3   where D_1 represents the expected dividend over the coming year and g is the

4   expected growth rate of dividends. This is known as the constant-growth version

5   of the DCF model. To use the constant-growth DCF model to estimate a firm's

6   cost of equity, one solves for k in the above expression to obtain the following:

7

8
$$k = \frac{D_1}{P} + g$$

9

10   **Q. In your opinion, is the constant-growth DCF model appropriate for public**

11   **utilities?**

12   A. Yes. The economics of the public utility business indicate that the industry is in

13   the steady-state or constant-growth stage of a three-stage DCF. The economics

14   include the relative stability of the utility business, the maturity of the demand for

15   public utility services, and the regulated status of public utilities (especially the

16   fact that their returns on investment are effectively set through the ratemaking

17   process). The DCF valuation procedure for companies in this stage is the constant-

18   growth DCF. In the constant-growth version of the DCF model, the current

19   dividend payment and stock price are directly observable. However, the primary

20   problem and controversy in applying the DCF model to estimate equity cost rates

21   entails estimating investors' expected dividend growth rate.

22

1   **Q. What factors should one consider when applying the DCF methodology?**

2   A. One should be sensitive to several factors when using the DCF model to estimate

3   a firm's cost of equity capital. In general, one must recognize the assumptions

4   under which the DCF model was developed in estimating its components (the

5   dividend yield and the expected growth rate). The dividend yield can be measured

6   precisely at any point in time; however, it tends to vary somewhat over time.

7   Estimation of expected growth is considerably more difficult. One must consider

8   recent firm performance, in conjunction with current economic developments and

9   other information available to investors, to accurately estimate investors'

10   expectations.

11

12 **Q. What dividend yields have you reviewed?**

13 A. I have calculated the dividend yields for the companies in the proxy group using

14   the current annual dividend and the 30-day, 90-day, and 180-day average stock

15   prices. These dividend yields are provided on page 2 of Attachment JRW-7. For

16   the Gas Proxy Group, the mean and median dividend yields using the 30-day, 90-

17   day, and 180-day average stock prices range from 3.5% to 3.8%. Given this range,

18   I am using 3.65% as the dividend yield for the Gas Proxy Group.

19

20 **Q. Please discuss the appropriate adjustment to the spot dividend yield.**

21 A. According to the traditional DCF model, the dividend yield term relates to the

22   dividend yield over the coming period. As indicated by Professor Myron Gordon,

23   who is commonly associated with the development of the DCF model for popular

1   use, this is obtained by: (1) multiplying the expected dividend over the coming

2   quarter by 4, and (2) dividing this dividend by the current stock price to determine

3   the appropriate dividend yield for a firm that pays dividends on a quarterly basis.[12]

4   In applying the DCF model, some analysts adjust the current dividend for growth

5   over the coming year as opposed to the coming quarter. This can be complicated

6   because firms tend to announce changes in dividends at different times during the

7   year. As such, the dividend yield computed based on presumed growth over the

8   coming quarter as opposed to the coming year can be quite different.

9   Consequently, it is common for analysts to adjust the dividend yield by some

10   fraction of the long-term expected growth rate.

11

12   **Q. Given this discussion, what adjustment factor do you use for your dividend**

13   **yield?**

14   A. I adjust the dividend yield by one-half (1/2) of the expected growth so as to reflect

15   growth over the coming year. The DCF equity cost rate ("k") is computed as:

16

17
$$K = \left[\left(\frac{D}{P} \right) \times (1 + 0.5g) \right] + g$$

18

19   **Q. Please discuss the growth rate component of the DCF model.**

20   A. There is debate as to the proper methodology to employ in estimating the growth

21   component of the DCF model. By definition, this component is investors'

---

[12] *Petition for Modification of Prescribed Rate of Return*, Federal Communications Commission, Docket No. 79-05, Direct Testimony of Myron J. Gordon and Lawrence I. Gould at 62 (April 1980).

1   expectation of the long-term dividend growth rate. Presumably, investors use

2   some combination of historical and/or projected growth rates for earnings and

3   dividends per share and for internal or book-value growth to assess long-term

4   potential.

5

6   Q. **What growth data have you reviewed for the proxy group?**

7   A. I have analyzed a number of measures of growth for companies in the proxy group.

8   I reviewed *Value Line's* historical and projected growth rate estimates for EPS,

9   dividends per share ("DPS"), and book value per share ("BVPS"). In addition, I

10   utilized the average EPS growth rate forecasts of Wall Street analysts as provided

11   by Yahoo, Zacks, and S&P Capital IQ. These services solicit the long-term (three-

12   to-five-year) earnings growth rate projections from securities analysts and compile

13   and publish the means and medians of these forecasts. Finally, I also assessed

14   prospective growth as measured by prospective earnings retention rates and earned

15   returns on common equity.

16

17   Q. **Please discuss historical growth in earnings and dividends as well as internal**

18   **growth.**

19   A. Historical growth rates for EPS, DPS, and BVPS are readily available to investors

20   and are presumably an important ingredient in forming expectations concerning

21   future growth. However, one must use historical growth numbers as measures of

22   investors' expectations with caution. In some cases, past growth may not reflect

23   future growth potential. Also, employing a single growth rate number (for

35

1   example, for five or ten years) is unlikely to accurately measure investors'

2   expectations, due to the sensitivity of a single growth rate figure to fluctuations in

3   individual firm performance as well as overall economic fluctuations (i.e.,

4   business cycles). However, one must appraise the context in which the growth

5   rate is being employed. According to the conventional DCF model, the expected

6   return on a security is equal to the sum of the dividend yield and the expected long-

7   term growth in dividends. Therefore, to best estimate the cost of common equity

8   capital using the conventional DCF model, one must look to long-term growth rate

9   expectations.

10   Internally generated growth is a function of the percentage of earnings retained

11   within the firm (the earnings retention rate) and the rate of return earned on those

12   earnings (the return on equity). The internal growth rate is computed as the

13   retention rate times the return on equity. Internal growth is significant in

14   determining long-run earnings and, therefore, dividends. Investors recognize the

15   importance of internally generated growth and pay premiums for stocks of

16   companies that retain earnings and earn high returns on internal investments.

17

18   Q. **Please discuss the services that provide analysts' EPS forecasts.**

19   A. Analysts' EPS forecasts for companies are collected and published by a number of

20   different investment information services, including Institutional Brokers Estimate

21   System ("I/B/E/S"), Bloomberg, FactSet, S&P Capital IQ, Zacks, First Call and

22   Reuters, among others. Thompson Reuters publishes analysts' EPS forecasts under

23   different product names, including I/B/E/S, First Call, and Reuters. Bloomberg,

36

1   FactSet, S&P Capital IQ, and Zacks publish their own set of analysts' EPS forecasts

2   for companies. These services do not reveal: (1) the analysts who are solicited for

3   forecasts; or (2) the identity of the analysts who actually provide the EPS forecasts

4   that are used in the compilations published by the services. I/B/E/S, Bloomberg,

5   FactSet, S&P Capital IQ, and First Call are fee-based services. These services

6   usually provide detailed reports and other data in addition to analysts' EPS forecasts.

7   Thompson Reuters and Zacks do provide limited EPS forecast data free-of-charge

8   on the internet. Yahoo finance (http://finance.yahoo.com) lists Thompson Reuters

9   as the source of its summary EPS forecasts. The Reuters website (www.reuters.com)

10   also publishes EPS forecasts from Thompson Reuters, but with more detail. Zacks

11   (www.zacks.com) publishes its summary forecasts on its website. Zacks estimates

12   are also available on other websites, such as msn.money (http://money.msn.com).

13

14   **Q. Which of these EPS forecasts is used in developing a DCF growth rate?**

15   A. The DCF growth rate is the long-term projected growth rate in EPS, DPS, and

16   BVPS. Therefore, in developing an equity cost rate using the DCF model, the

17   projected long-term growth rate is the projection used in the DCF model.

18

19   **Q. Why do you not rely exclusively on the EPS forecasts of Wall Street analysts in**

20   **arriving at a DCF growth rate for the proxy group?**

21   A. There are several reasons. First, the appropriate growth rate in the DCF model is

22   the dividend growth rate, not the earnings growth rate. Nonetheless, over the very

23   long term, dividends and earnings will have to grow at a similar growth rate.

1   Therefore, consideration must be given to other indicators of growth, including

2   prospective dividend growth, internal growth, as well as projected earnings

3   growth. Second, a 2011 study by Lacina, Lee, and Xu has shown that analysts'

4   long-term earnings growth rate forecasts are not more accurate at forecasting

5   future earnings than just using last year's earnings figure as the projected future

6   earnings number.[13] Employing data over a 20-year period, these authors

7   demonstrate that using the most recent year's EPS figure to forecast EPS in the

8   next 3-5 years proved to be just as accurate as using the EPS estimates from

9   analysts' long-term earnings growth rate forecasts. In the authors' opinion, these

10   results indicate that analysts' long-term earnings growth rate forecasts should be

11   used with caution as inputs for valuation and cost of capital purposes. Finally, and

12   most significantly, it is well known that the long-term EPS growth rate forecasts

13   of Wall Street securities analysts are overly optimistic and upwardly biased. This

14   has been demonstrated in a number of academic studies over the years.[14] Hence,

15   using these growth rates as a DCF growth rate will provide an overstated equity

16   cost rate. On this issue, a study by Easton and Sommers (2007) found that

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[13]   M. Lacina, B. Lee & Z. Xu (2011),*Advances in Business and Management Forecasting* Vol. 8, Kenneth D. Lawrence, Ronald K. Klimberg (ed.), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp.77-101.

[14]   The studies that demonstrate analysts' long-term EPS forecasts are overly-optimistic and upwardly biased include: R.D. Harris, "The Accuracy, Bias, and Efficiency of Analysts' Long Run Earnings Growth Forecasts," *Journal of Business Finance & Accounting*, pp. 725-55 (June/July 1999); P. DeChow, A. Hutton, and R. Sloan, "The Relation Between Analysts' Forecasts of Long-Term Earnings Growth and Stock Price Performance Following Equity Offerings," *Contemporary Accounting Research* (2000); K. Chan, L., Karceski, J., & Lakonishok, J., "The Level and Persistence of Growth Rates," *Journal of Finance* pp. 643−684, (2003); M. Lacina, B. Lee and Z. Xu, (2011), *Advances in Business and Management Forecasting (Vol. 8),* Kenneth D. Lawrence, Ronald K. Klimberg (ed.), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp.77-101; and Marc H. Goedhart, Rishi Raj, and Abhishek Saxena, "Equity Analysts, Still Too Bullish," *McKinsey on Finance*, pp. 14-17, (Spring 2010).

1   optimism in analysts' growth rate forecasts leads to an upward bias in estimates of

2   the cost of equity capital of almost 3.0 percentage points.[15]

3

4   **Q. Are the projected EPS growth rates of *Value Line* also overly optimistic and**

5   **upwardly biased?**

6   A. Yes. A study by Szakmary, Conover, and Lancaster (2008) evaluated the accuracy

7   of *Value Line*'s three-to-five-year EPS growth rate forecasts using companies in

8   the Dow Jones Industrial Average over a thirty-year time period and found these

9   forecasted EPS growth rates to be significantly higher than the EPS growth rates

10   that these companies subsequently achieved.[16]

11

12   **Q. Is it your opinion that stock prices reflect the upward bias in the EPS growth**

13   **rate forecast?**

14   A. Yes, I do believe that investors are well aware of the bias in analysts' EPS growth

15   rate forecasts and stock prices, therefore, reflect the upward bias.

16

17   **Q. How does that affect the use of these forecasts in a DCF equity cost rate study?**

18   A. According to the DCF model, the equity cost rate is a function of the dividend yield

19   and expected growth rate. Since this bias is well known, stock prices and therefore

---

[15] Peter D. Easton & Gregory A. Sommers, "Effect of Analysts' Optimism on Estimates of the Expected Rate of Return Implied by Earnings Forecasts," 45 J. ACCT. RES. 983–1015 (2007).

[16] Szakmary, A., Conover, C., & Lancaster, C. (2008). "An Examination of *Value Line*'s Long-Term Projections," *Journal of Banking & Finance*, May 2008, pp. 820-833.

1   dividend yields reflect this bias. However, in the DCF model, the growth rate needs

2   to be adjusted downward from the projected EPS growth rate to reflect the upward

3   bias.

4

5   **Q. Please discuss the historical growth of the companies in the proxy group, as**

6   **provided by V*alue Line.***

7   A. Page 3 of Attachment JRW-7 provides the 5- and 10-year historical growth rates

8   for EPS, DPS, and BVPS for the companies in the proxy group, as published in

9   the *Value Line Investment Survey.* The median historical growth measures for

10   EPS, DPS, and BVPS for the Gas Proxy Group range from 4.3% to 6.5%, with an

11   average of the medians of 5.4%.

12

13   **Q. Please summarize V*alue Line's* projected growth rates for the companies in**

14   **the proxy group.**

15   A. *Value Line's* projections of EPS, DPS, and BVPS growth for the companies in the

16   proxy group are shown on page 4 of Attachment JRW-7. Due to the presence of

17   outliers, the medians are used in the analysis. For the Gas Proxy Group, as shown

18   on page 4 of Attachment JRW-7, the medians range from 4.5% to 8.0%, with an

19   average of the medians of 6.2%.[17]

---

[17]   In the rebuttal section of this testimony, I address the issues with the *Value Line* growth rates. *Value Line* uses a different approach in estimating projected growth. *Value Line* does not project growth from today, but *Value Line* projects growth from a three-year base period – 2018-2020 – to a projected three-year period for the period 2024-2026. Using this approach, the three-year based period can have a significant impact on the *Value L*ine growth rate if this base period includes years with abnormally high or low earnings. Therefore, I evaluate these growth rates separately from analysts EPS growth rates.

1   Also provided on page 4 of Attachment JRW-7 are the prospective sustainable

2   growth rates for the companies in the proxy group as measured by *Value Line*'s

3   average projected retention rate and return on shareholders' equity. As noted

4   above, sustainable growth is a significant and a primary driver of long-run earnings

5   growth. For the Gas Proxy Group, the median prospective sustainable growth rate

6   is 3.9 %.

7

8   **Q. Please assess growth for the proxy group as measured by analysts' forecasts**

9   **of expected 5-year EPS growth.**

10 A. Yahoo Finance, Zacks, and S&P Capital IQ collect, summarize, and publish Wall

11   Street analysts' long-term EPS growth rate forecasts for the companies in the

12   proxy group. These forecasts are provided for the companies in the proxy group

13   on page 5 of Attachment JRW-7. I have reported the median growth rate for the

14   group.[18] Since there is considerable overlap in analyst coverage between the two

15   services, and not all of the companies have forecasts from the different services, I

16   have averaged the expected three-to-five-year EPS growth rates from the three

17   services for each company to arrive at an expected EPS growth rate for each

18   company. The median of analysts' projected EPS growth rates for the Gas Proxy

19   Group is 5.3%.

20

---

[18]   I report the median and not the mean due SJI's 18.5% being an outlier.

41

1 **Q. Please summarize your analysis of the historical and prospective growth of**

2 **the proxy group.**

3 A. Page 6 of Attachment JRW-7 shows the summary DCF growth rate indicators for

4 the proxy group.

5 The historical growth rate indicators for my Gas Proxy Group imply a baseline

6 growth rate of 5.4%. The average of the projected EPS, DPS, and BVPS growth

7 rates from *Value Line* is 6.2%, and *Value Line*'s projected sustainable growth rate

8 is 3.9 %. The median projected EPS growth rate of Wall Street analysts for the

9 Gas Proxy Group is 5.50%. The overall range for the projected growth rate

10 indicators (ignoring historical growth) is 3.9 to 6.2%. Giving primary weight to

11 the projected EPS growth rate of Wall Street analysts, yet also recognizing the

12 upward bias in analysts' EPS growth rate forecasts, I believe that the appropriate

13 projected growth rate range is 5.25%. This growth rate figure is in the upper end

14 of the range of historic and projected growth rates for the Gas Proxy Group.

15

16 **Q. What are the results from your application of the DCF model?**

17 A. My DCF-derived equity cost rate for the group are summarized on page 1 of

18 Attachment JRW-7 and in Table 3 below.

19 **Table 3**
20 **DCF-derived Equity Cost Rate/ROE**

	Dividend Yield	1 + ½ Growth Adjustment	DCF Growth Rate	Equity Cost Rate
Gas Proxy Group	**3.65%**	**1.02625**	**5.25%**	**9.00%**

21

1   The result for the Gas Proxy Group is the 3.65% dividend yield, times the one

2   and one-half growth adjustment of 1.02625, plus the DCF growth rate of 5.25%,

3   which results in an equity cost rate of 9.0%.

4

5   **B.   Capital Asset Pricing Model**

6

7   **Q. Please discuss the Capital Asset Pricing Model ("CAPM").**

8   A. The CAPM is a risk premium approach to gauging a firm's cost of equity capital.

9   According to the risk premium approach, the cost of equity is the sum of the

10   interest rate on a risk-free bond (R_f) and a risk premium (RP), as in the following:

11   k   = R_f +   RP
12

13   The yield on long-term U.S. Treasury securities is normally used as R_f. Risk

14   premiums are measured in different ways. The CAPM is a theory of the risk and

15   expected returns of common stocks. In the CAPM, two types of risk are associated

16   with a stock: firm-specific risk or unsystematic risk, and market or systematic

17   risk, which is measured by a firm's beta. The only risk that investors receive a

18   return for bearing is systematic risk.

19   According to the CAPM, the expected return on a company's stock, which is

20   also the equity cost rate (k), is equal to:

21          $k = (R_f) + \beta * [E(R_m) - (R_f)]$
22
23   Where:
24   k represents the estimated rate of return on the stock;
25          $E(R_m)$ represents the expected return on the overall stock market. Frequently,

43

1   the 'market' refers to the S&P 500;

2   (R_f) represents the risk-free rate of interest;

3   *[E(R$_m$) - (R$_f$)]* represents the expected equity or market risk premium—the

4   excess return that an investor expects to receive above the risk-free rate for

5   investing in risky stocks; and

6   *Beta*—(ß) is a measure of the systematic risk of an asset.

7

8   To estimate the required return or cost of equity using the CAPM requires three

9   inputs: the risk-free rate of interest (R_f), the beta (ß), and the expected equity or

10   market risk premium *[E(R$_m$) - (R$_f$)]*. R_f is the easiest of the inputs to measure – it

11   is represented by the yield on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds. ß, the measure of

12   systematic risk, is a little more difficult to measure because there are different

13   opinions about what adjustments, if any, should be made to historical betas due to

14   their tendency to regress to 1.0 over time. And finally, an even more difficult input

15   to measure is the expected equity or market risk premium *(E(R$_m$) - (R$_f$))*. I will

16   discuss each of these inputs below.

17

18 **Q. Please discuss Attachment JRW-8.**

19 A. Attachment JRW-8 provides the summary results for my CAPM study. Page 1

20   shows the results, and the following pages contain the supporting data.

21

22 **Q. Please discuss the risk-free interest rate.**

23 A. The yield on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds has usually been viewed as the risk-

24   free rate of interest in the CAPM. The yield on long-term U.S. Treasury bonds, in

44

1   turn, has been considered to be the yield on U.S. Treasury bonds with 30-year

2   maturities.

3

4   **Q. What risk-free interest rate are you using in your CAPM?**

5   A. As shown on page 2 of Attachment JRW-8, the yield on 30-year U.S. Treasury

6   bonds has been in the 1.3 percent to 4.75 percent range over the 2010–2021 time

7   period. The current 30-year Treasury yield is near the middle of this range. Given

8   the recent range of yields, I have chosen to use a yield toward the middle of the

9   range as my risk-free interest rate. Therefore, I am using 2.50 percent as the risk-

10   free rate, or R_f, in my CAPM. This rate is consistent with Duff & Phelps, who are

11   also using 2.50 percent (see page 7 of Attachment JRW-8).[19]

12

13   **Q. Does the 2.50% risk-free interest rate take into consideration of forecasts of**

14   **higher interest rates?**

15   A. No, it does not. As I stated before, forecasts of higher interest rates have been

16   notoriously wrong for a decade. My 2.50 percent risk-free interest rate takes into

17   account the range of interest rates in the past and effectively synchronizes the risk-

18   free rate with the market risk premium. The risk-free rate and the market risk

19   premium are interrelated in that the market risk premium is developed in relation

20   to the risk-free rate. As discussed below, my market risk premium is based on the

21   results of many studies and surveys that have been published over time. Therefore,

---

[19]   Duff & Phelps, *Cost of Capital Research Center* (2020),
        https://www.duffandphelps.com/insights/publications/cost-of-capital

1   my risk-free interest rate of 2.50 percent is effectively a normalized risk-free rate

2   of interest.

3

4   **Q. Please discuss Betas in the CAPM?**

5   A. Beta (ß) is a measure of the systematic risk of a stock. The market, usually taken

6   to be the S&P 500, has a beta of 1.0. The beta of a stock with the same price

7   movement as the market also has a beta of 1.0. A stock whose price movement is

8   greater than that of the market, such as a technology stock, is riskier than the

9   market and has a beta greater than 1.0. A stock with below average price

10   movement, such as that of a regulated public utility, is less risky than the market

11   and has a beta less than 1.0. Estimating a stock's beta involves running a linear

12   regression of a stock's return on the market return.

13   As shown on page 3 of Attachment JRW-8, the slope of the regression line is

14   the stock's ß. A steeper line indicates that the stock is more sensitive to the return

15   on the overall market. This means that the stock has a higher ß and greater-than-

16   average market risk. A less steep line indicates a lower ß and less market risk.

17   Several online investment information services, such as Yahoo and Reuters,

18   provide estimates of stock betas. Usually these services report different betas for

19   the same stock. The differences are usually due to: (1) the time period over which

20   ß is measured; and (2) any adjustments that are made to reflect the fact that betas

21   tend to regress to 1.0 over time.

22

23 **Q. Please discuss the recent change in betas.**

1 A. I have traditionally used the betas as provided in the *Value Line Investment*

2 *Survey*. As discussed above, the betas for utilities recently increased significantly

3 as a result of the volatility of utility stocks during the stock market meltdown

4 associated with the novel coronavirus in March. Utility betas as measured by

5 *Value Line* have been in the 0.55 to 0.70 range for the past 10 years. But utility

6 stocks were much more volatile relative to the market in March and April of 2020,

7 and this resulted in an increase of above 0.30 to the average utility beta.

8 *Value Line* defines their computation of beta as:[20]

9 Beta - A relative measure of the historical sensitivity of a stock's price
10 to overall fluctuations in the New York Stock Exchange Composite
11 Index. A Beta of 1.50 indicates a stock tends to rise (or fall) 50% more
12 than the New York Stock Exchange Composite Index. The ''Beta
13 coefficient'' is derived from a regression analysis of the relationship
14 between weekly percent-age changes in the price of a stock and
15 weekly percentage changes in the NYSE Index over a period of five
16 years. In the case of shorter price histories, a smaller time period is
17 used, but two years is the minimum. The Betas are adjusted for their
18 long-term tendency to converge toward 1.00. Value Line then adjusts
19 these Betas to account for their long-term tendency to converge
20 toward 1.00.

21 However, there are several issues with *Value Line* betas:

22 1. *Value Line* betas are computed using weekly returns, and the volatility of

23 utility stocks during March 2020 was impacted by using weekly and not monthly

24 returns. Yahoo Finance uses five years of monthly returns to compute betas, and

25 Yahoo Finance's betas for utilities are lower than *Value Line*'s.

26 2. *Value Line* betas are computed using the New York Stock Exchange Index as

27 the market. While about 3,000 stocks trade on the NYSE, most technology stocks

---

[20] *Value Line* (2021) www.valueline.com.

1   are traded on the NASDAQ or over-the-counter market and not the NYSE.

2   Technology stocks, which make up about 25 percent of the S&P 500, tend to be

3   more volatile. If they were traded on the NYSE, they would increase the volatility

4   of the measure of the market and thereby lower utility betas.

5   3. Major vendors of CAPM betas such as Merrill Lynch, *Value Line*, and Bloomberg

6   publish adjusted betas. The so-called "Blume adjustment" cited by *Value Line*

7   adjusts betas calculated using historical returns data to reflect the tendency of stock

8   betas to regress toward 1.0 over time, which means that the betas of typical low beta

9   stocks tend to increase toward 1.0, and the betas of typical high beta stocks tend to

10   decrease toward 1.0.[21]

11   The Blume adjustment procedure is:

12   Regressed Beta = .67 * (Observed Beta) + 0.33

13   For example, suppose a company has an observed past beta of 0.50. The regressed

14   (Blume-adjusted) beta would be:

15   Regressed Beta = .67 * (0.50) + 0.33 = 0.67

16   Blume offered two reasons for betas to regress toward 1.0. First, he suggested it

17   may be a by-product of management's efforts to keep the level of firm's systematic

18   risk close to that of the market. He also speculated that it results from

19   management's efforts to diversify through investment projects.

20   However, there is an issue with using regressed betas for utilities. Specifically,

21   a study by Michelfelder and Theodossiou investigated whether regressed Betas are

---

[21]   M. Blume, *On the Assessment of Risk*, J. OF FIN. (Mar. 1971).

1   appropriate for utilities.[22]   Conceptually, Michelfelder and Theodossiou suggested

2   that utilities are different from unregulated companies in several areas, which may

3   result in betas not regressing toward 1.0:[23]

4   Being natural monopolies in their own geographic areas, public utilities
5   have more influence on the prices of their product (gas and electricity)
6   than other firms. The rate setting process provides public utilities with
7   the opportunity to adjust prices of gas and electricity to recover the
8   rising costs of fuel and other materials used in the transmission and
9   distribution of electricity and gas.[24]

10   To test for a regression toward 1.0, the authors used monthly holding period total

11   returns for 57 publicly traded U.S. public utilities for the period from January 1962

12   to December 2007 using 60, 84, 96, and 108 monthly returns over five different non-

13   lapping periods.   They also used alternative time periods and got similar results.

14   From their analysis of the data, the authors concluded that "public utility betas do not

15   have a tendency to converge to 1".[25]

16   Major vendors of CAPM Betas such as Merrill Lynch, Value Line, and
17   Bloomberg distribute Blume adjusted betas to investors. We have
18   shown empirically that public utility betas do not have a tendency to
19   converge to 1. Short-term Betas of public utilities follow a cyclical
20   pattern with recent downward trends, then upward structural breaks
21   with long-term betas following a downward trend.

22   The authors concluded that utility betas converge to 0.59 as opposed to 1.0.

23   The implication is that using regressed betas such as those from *Value Line* will

24   result in an inflated expected return using the CAPM for utilities.

---

[22]   Richard A. Michelfelder and Panayiotis Theodossiou, *Public Utility Beta Adjustment and Biased Costs of Capital in Public Utility Rate Proceedings*, THE ELECTRICITY J., (Nov. 2013).

[23]   *Id.* at 61.

[24]   *Id.*

[25]   *Id.*

1

2   **Q. Given this discussion, what Betas are you using in your CAPM?**

3   A. As shown on page 3 of Attachment JRW-8, the median *Value Line* beta for the

4   Gas Proxy Group is 0.85. At present, I will continue to use *Value Line* betas in

5   my CAPM, which I believe is a conservative approach.

6

7   **Q. Please discuss the market risk premium.**

8   A. The market risk premium is equal to the expected return on the stock market (e.g.,

9   the expected return on the S&P 500, $E(R_m)$ minus the risk-free rate of interest (R_f)).

10   The market risk premium is the difference in the expected total return between

11   investing in equities and investing in "safe" fixed-income assets, such as long-term

12   government bonds. However, while the market risk premium is easy to define

13   conceptually, it is difficult to measure because it requires an estimate of the

14   expected return on the market - $E(R_m)$. As I discus below, there are different ways

15   to measure $E(R_m)$, and studies have come up with significantly different

16   magnitudes for $E(R_m)$. As Merton Miller, the 1990 Nobel Prize winner in

17   economics indicated, $E(R_m)$ is very difficult to measure and is one of the great

18   mysteries in finance.[26]

19

20   **Q. Please discuss the alternative approaches to estimating the market risk**

21   **premium.**

---

[26] Merton Miller, *The History of Finance: An Eyewitness Account*, J. OF APPLIED CORP. FIN., 3 (2000).

50

1   A. Page 4 of Attachment JRW-8 highlights the primary approaches to, and issues in,

2   estimating the expected market risk premium. The traditional way to measure the

3   market risk premium was to use the difference between historical average stock

4   and bond returns. In this case, historical stock and bond returns, also called *ex*

5   *post* returns, were used as the measures of the market's expected return (known as

6   the *ex ante* or forward-looking expected return). This type of historical evaluation

7   of stock and bond returns is often called the "Ibbotson approach" after Professor

8   Roger Ibbotson, who popularized this method of using historical financial market

9   returns as measures of expected returns. However, this historical evaluation of

10   returns can be a problem because: (1) *ex post* returns are not the same as *ex ante*

11   expectations; (2) market risk premiums can change over time, increasing when

12   investors become more risk-averse and decreasing when investors become less

13   risk-averse; and (3) market conditions can change such that *ex post* historical

14   returns are poor estimates of *ex ante* expectations.

15   The use of historical returns as market expectations has been criticized in

16   numerous academic studies, which I discuss later. The general theme of these

17   studies is that the large equity risk premium discovered in historical stock and bond

18   returns cannot be justified by the fundamental data. These studies, which fall

19   under the category "*Ex Ante* Models and Market Data," compute *ex ante* expected

20   returns using market data to arrive at an expected equity risk premium. These

21   studies have also been called "Puzzle Research" after the famous study by Mehra

51

1   and Prescott in which the authors first questioned the magnitude of historical

2   equity risk premiums relative to fundamentals.[27]

3   In addition, there are a number of surveys of financial professionals regarding

4   the market risk premium, as well as several published surveys of academics on the

5   equity risk premium. Duke University has published a CFO Survey on a quarterly

6   basis for over 10 years.[28] Questions regarding expected stock and bond returns

7   are also included in the Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia's annual survey of

8   financial forecasters, which is published as the *Survey of Professional*

9   *Forecasters*.[29] This survey of professional economists has been published for

10   almost 50 years.   In addition, Pablo Fernandez conducts annual surveys of

11   financial analysts and companies regarding the equity risk premiums used in their

12   investment and financial decision-making.[30]

13   **Q. Please discuss the alternative approaches to estimating the market risk**

14   **premium.**

---

[27]   Rajnish Mehra & Edward C. Prescott, The Equity Premium: A Puzzle, J. OF MONETARY ECON. 145 (1985).

[28]   DUKE UNIVERSITY, *The CFO Survey* (2020) https://www.richmondfed.org/cfosurvey.

[29]   FEDERAL RESERVE BANK OF PHILADELPHIA, *Survey of Professional Forecasters* (Feb. 2020), https://www.philadelphiafed.org/-/media/research-and-data/real-time-center/survey-of-professional-forecasters/2019/spfq119.pdf?la=en. The Survey of Professional Forecasters was formerly conducted by the American Statistical Association (ASA) and the National Bureau of Economic Research (NBER) and was known as the ASA/NBER survey. The survey, which began in 1968, is conducted each quarter. The Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, in cooperation with the NBER, assumed responsibility for the survey in June 1990.

[30]   Pablo Fernandez, Eduardo Apellániz, & Javier Acín, SURVEY: MARKET RISK PREMIUM AND RISK-FREE RATE USED FOR 81 COUNTRIES IN 2020 (Mar. 25, 2020), IESE Business School Working Paper No. WP-1244-E, Available at SSRN: https://ssrn.com/abstract=3560869 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3560869 .

1   A. Derrig and Orr, Fernandez, and Song completed the most comprehensive reviews

2   of the research on the market risk premium.[31] Derrig and Orr's study evaluated

3   the various approaches to estimating market risk premiums, discussed the issues

4   with the alternative approaches, and summarized the findings of the published

5   research on the market risk premium. Fernandez examined four alternative

6   measures of the market risk premium – historical, expected, required, and implied.

7   He also reviewed the major studies of the market risk premium and presented the

8   summary market risk premium results. Song provided an annotated bibliography

9   and highlighted the alternative approaches to estimating the market risk premium.

10   Page 5 of Attachment JRW-8 provides a summary of the results of the primary

11   risk premium studies reviewed by Derrig and Orr, as well as other more recent

12   studies of the market risk premium. In developing page 5 of Attachment JRW-8,

13   I have categorized the types of studies as discussed on page 4 of Attachment JRW-

14   8. I have also included the results of studies of the "Building Blocks" approach to

15   estimating the equity risk premium. The Building Blocks approach is a hybrid

16   approach employing elements of both historical and *ex ante* models.

17
18   **Q. Please provide a summary of the market risk premium studies.**

19   A. Page 5 of Attachment JRW-8 provides a summary of the results of the market risk

20   premium studies that I have reviewed. These include the results of: (1) the various

---

[31]   *See* Richard Derrig & Elisha Orr, EQUITY RISK PREMIUM: EXPECTATIONS GREAT AND SMALL, Working Paper (version 3.0), Automobile Insurers Bureau of Massachusetts, (Aug. 28, 2003); Pablo Fernandez, EQUITY PREMIUM: HISTORICAL, EXPECTED, REQUIRED, AND IMPLIED, IESE Business School Working Paper (2007); Zhiyi Song, THE EQUITY RISK PREMIUM: AN ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY, CFA Institute (2007).

1   studies of the historical risk premium, (2) *ex ante* market risk premium studies, (3)

2   market risk premium surveys of CFOs, financial forecasters, analysts, companies,

3   and academics, and (4) the Building Blocks approach to the market risk premium.

4   There are results reported for over 30 studies, and the median market risk premium

5   of these studies is 4.83 percent.

6

7   **Q. Please highlight the results of the more recent risk premium studies and**

8   **surveys.**

9   A. The studies cited on page 5 of Attachment JRW-8 include every market risk

10   premium study and survey I could identify that was published over the past 15

11   years and that provided a market risk premium estimate. Many of these studies

12   were published prior to the financial crisis that began in 2008. In addition, some

13   of these studies were published in the early 2000s at the market peak. It should be

14   noted that many of these studies (as indicated) used data over long periods of time

15   (as long as 50 years of data) and so were not estimating a market risk premium as

16   of a specific point in time (e.g., the year 2001). To assess the effect of the earlier

17   studies on the market risk premium, I have reconstructed page 5 of Attachment

18   JRW-8 on page 6 of Attachment JRW-8; however, I have eliminated all studies

19   dated before January 2, 2010. The median market risk premium estimate for this

20   subset of studies is 5.13 percent.

21

22   **Q. Please summarize the market risk premium studies and surveys.**

1 A. As noted above, there are three approaches to estimating the market risk premium

2 – historic stock and bond returns, *ex ante* or expected returns models, and surveys.

3 The studies on page 6 of Attachment JRW-8 can be summarized in the following

4 manners:

5 <u>Historic Stock and Bond Returns</u> - Historic stock and bond returns suggest a

6 market risk premium in the 4.40 percent to 6.43 percent range, depending on

7 whether one uses arithmetic or geometric mean returns.

8 <u>Ex Ante Models</u> - Market risk premium studies that use expected or ex ante

9 return models indicate a market risk premium in the range of 5.24 percent to 6.75

10 percent.

11 <u>Surveys</u> - Market risk premiums developed from surveys of analysts,

12 companies, financial professionals, and academics are lower, with a range from

13 3.36 percent to 5.70 percent.

14 <u>Building Blocks</u> - the Market risk premiums developed using the Building

15 Blocks approach range from 3.00 percent to 5.21 percent.

16

17 **Q. Please highlight the *ex ante* market risk premium studies and surveys that**

18 **you believe are most timely and relevant.**

19 A. I will highlight several studies/surveys.

20 Pablo Fernandez conducts annual surveys of financial analysts and companies

21 regarding the equity risk premiums used in their investment and financial decision-

22 making.[32] His survey results are included on pages 5 and 6 of Attachment JRW-

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[32]   Pablo Fernandez, Vitaly Pershin, and Isabel Fernandez Acín, A Survey: MARKET RISK PREMIUM

1   8. The results of his 2020 survey of academics, financial analysts, and companies,

2   which included 4,000 responses, indicated a mean market risk premium employed

3   by U.S. analysts and companies of 5.6 percent.[33] His estimated market risk

4   premium for the U.S. has been in the 5.00 percent to 5.60 percent range in recent

5   years.

6   Professor Aswath Damodaran of New York University, a leading expert on

7   valuation and the market risk premium, provides a monthly updated market risk

8   premium based on projected S&P 500 EPS and stock price level and long-term

9   interest rates. His estimated market risk premium, shown graphically in Figure 6,

10   below, for the past 20 years, has primarily been in the range of 5.0 percent to 6.0

11   percent since 2010. As of March 2021, his estimate of the implied market risk

12   premium was 4.63 percent.[34]

13   **Figure 6**
14   **Damodaran Market Risk Premium**

Source: Aswath   Damodaran,   *Damodaran   Online*,   N.Y.   UNIVERSITY,
http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/ (last visited March 9, 2021).

Duff & Phelps, an investment advisory firm, provides recommendations for

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AND RISK-FREE RATE USED FOR 81 COUNTRIES IN 2020, IESE Business School (Apr. 2020).

[33]   *Id.* at 3

[34]   Aswath Damodaran, *Damodaran Online*, N.Y. UNIVERSITY.

http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/.

the normalized risk-free interest rate and market risk premiums to be used in calculating the cost of capital data. Its recommendations over the 2008–2020 time periods are shown on page 7 of Attachment JRW-8 and are shown graphically in Figure 7. Over the past decade, Duff & Phelps' recommended normalized risk-free interest rates have been in the 2.50 percent to 4.00 percent and market risk premiums have been in the 5.0 percent to 6.0 percent range. In early 2020, in the wake of the novel coronavirus in 2020, Duff & Phelps decreased its recommended normalized risk-free interest rate from 3.0 percent to 2.50 percent and increased its market risk premium from 5.00 percent to 6.00 percent. Subsequently, on December 9, 2020, Duff & Phelps reduced its recommended market risk premium to 5.50%.[35] Finally, KPMG, the international accounting and consultancy firm, provides a market risk premium report which it updates quarterly. In its December 31, 2020 update, KPMG reduced its market risk premium from 6.75% to 6.25%.[36]

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[35] https://www.duffandphelps.com/insights/publications/cost-of-capital/duff-and-phelps-recommended-us-equity-risk-premium-decreased-december-2020.

[36] KPMG, "KPMG Corporate Finance NL recommends a MRP of 6.25% as per 31 December 2020," https://indialogue.io/clients/reports/public/5d9da61986db2894649a7ef2/5d9da63386db2894649a7ef5.

Figure 7
Duff & Phelps
Normalized Risk-Free Rate and Market Risk Premium Recommendations
2007-2021

Source: https://www.duffandphelps.com/insights/publications/cost-of-capital

1   Q. **Given these results, what market risk premium are you using in your CAPM?**

2   A. The studies on page 6 of Attachment JRW-8, and more importantly, the more

3   timely and relevant studies just cited, suggest that the appropriate market risk

4   premium in the U.S. is in the 4.0 percent to 6.0 percent range. I will use an

5   expected market risk premium of 6.00 percent, which is the upper end of the range,

6   as the market risk premium. I gave most weight to the market risk premium

7   estimates of Duff & Phelps, KPMG, the Fernandez survey, and Damodaran. This

8   is a conservatively high estimate of the market risk premium considering the many

9   studies and surveys of the market risk premium.

10
11 Q. **What equity cost rate is indicated by your CAPM analysis?**

12 A. The results of my CAPM study for the proxy group are summarized on page 1 of

13   Attachment JRW-8 and in Table 4.

58

1   **Table 4**
2   **CAPM-derived Equity Cost Rate/ROE**
3    $K = (R_f) + \beta * [E(R_m) - (R_f)]$

	Risk-Free Rate	Beta	Equity Risk Premium	Equity Cost Rate
Gas Proxy Group	**2.50%**	**0.85**	**6.00%**	**7.60%**

4

5   For the Gas Proxy Group, the risk-free rate of 2.50% plus the product of the beta

6   of 0.85 times the equity risk premium of 6.00% results in a 7.60% equity cost rate.

7

8   **D.   Equity Cost Rate Summary**

9

10   **Q. Please summarize the results of your equity cost rate studies.**

11   A. My DCF and CAPM analyses for the Gas Proxy Group indicate equity cost rates

12   of 9.00% and 7.60%, respectively.

13   **Table 5**
14   **ROEs Derived from DCF and CAPM Models**

	DCF	CAPM
Gas Proxy Group	**9.00%**	**7.60%**

15   **Q. Given these results, what is your estimated equity cost rate for the group?**

16   A. Given these results, I conclude that the appropriate equity cost rate for companies

17   in the Gas Proxy Group is in the 7.60% to 9.00% range. However, since I rely

18   primarily on the DCF model, the recent rise in interest rates, and EnergyNorth's

19   risk, I conclude that the appropriate equity cost rate for the Company is 9.00%.

20

1 Q. **Please indicate why an equity cost rate of 9.00% is appropriate for the gas**

2   **operations of EnergyNorth.**

3 A. There are a number of reasons why an equity cost rate of 9.00% is appropriate and

4   fair for the Company in this case:

5   1. As shown in Attachment JRW-3, page 1, capital costs for utilities, as

6   indicated by long-term bond yields, are still at historically low levels. In addition,

7   given low inflationary expectations and slow global economic growth, interest

8   rates are likely to remain at low levels for some time.

9   2. As shown in Attachment JRW-6, page 2, the gas distribution industry is

10   among the lowest risk industries in the U.S. as measured by beta. As such, the

11   cost of equity capital for this industry is amongst the lowest in the U.S., according

12   to the CAPM.

13   3. The investment risk of EnergyNorth, as indicated by the Company's S&P

14   and DBRS credit ratings, is at the upper end of the risk level of the proxy group.

15   Therefore, I have used the upper end of the equity cost rate range.

16   4. The authorized ROEs for gas distribution companies have declined over

17   recent years from 9.94% in 2012, to 9.68% in 2013, 9.78% in 2014, 9.60% in 2015,

18   9.50% in 2016, 9.72% in 2017, 9.59% in 2018, 9.71% in 2019, and finally to

19   9.46% in 2020, according to Regulatory Research Associates.[37]   In my opinion,

20   authorized ROEs have lagged behind capital market cost rates, or in other words,

21   authorized ROEs have been slow to reflect low capital market cost rates.

---

[37] *S&P Global Market Intelligence, RRA Regulatory Focus*, 2021.

1   However, the <u>trend</u> has been towards lower ROEs and the <u>norm</u> now is below 10%.

2   Hence, I believe that my recommended ROE reflects our present historically low

3   capital cost rates, and these low capital cost rates are finally being recognized as

4   the norm by state utility regulatory commissions.

5

6   **Q. Please discuss your recommendation in light of a Moody's publication on the**

7   **subject of utility company ROEs and credit quality.**

8   A. Moody's published an article on utility ROEs and credit quality. In the article,

9   Moody's recognizes that authorized ROEs for electric and gas companies are

10   declining due to lower interest rates. [38]

11   The credit profiles of US regulated utilities will remain intact over
12   the next few years despite our expectation that regulators will
13   continue to trim the sector's profitability by lowering its authorized
14   returns on equity (ROE). Persistently low interest rates and a
15   comprehensive suite of cost recovery mechanisms ensure a low
16   business risk profile for utilities, prompting regulators to scrutinize
17   their profitability, which is defined as the ratio of net income to book
18   equity. We view cash flow measures as a more important rating
19   driver than authorized ROEs, and we note that regulators can lower
20   authorized ROEs without hurting cash flow, for instance by
21   targeting depreciation, or through special rate structures.
22

23   Moody's indicates that with the lower authorized ROEs, electric and gas

24   companies are earning ROEs of 9.0% to 10.0%, but this is not impairing their

25   credit profiles and is not deterring them from raising record amounts of capital.

26   With respect to authorized ROEs, Moody's recognizes that utilities and regulatory

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[38] Moody's Investors Service, "Lower Authorized Equity Returns Will Not Hurt Near-Term Credit
Profiles," March 10, 2015.

1   commissions are having trouble justifying higher ROEs in the face of lower

2   interest rates and cost recovery mechanisms.[39]

3   Robust cost recovery mechanisms will help ensure that US regulated
4   utilities' credit quality remains intact over the next few years. As a
5   result, falling authorized ROEs are not a material credit driver at this
6   time, but rather reflect regulators' struggle to justify the cost of
7   capital gap between the industry's authorized ROEs and persistently
8   low interest rates. We also see utilities struggling to defend this gap,
9   while at the same time recovering the vast majority of their costs
10   and investments through a variety of rate mechanisms.
11

12   Overall, this article further supports the belief that lower authorized ROEs are

13   unlikely to hurt the financial integrity of utilities or their ability to attract capital.

14

15   **VI.   Critique of EnergyNorth Rate of Return Testimony**

16

17   **Q. Please summarize the Company's rate of return recommendation.**

18   A. The Company has proposed a capital structure of 49.85% debt and 50.15%

19   common equity. The Company has recommended a long-term debt cost rate of

20   4.42%. Mr. Cochrane has recommended a common equity cost rate of 10.51% for

21   the gas distribution operations of EnergyNorth. The Company's overall proposed

22   rate of return is 7.47%. This is summarized on page 1 of in Attachment JRW-9.

23   **Q.   Please review Mr. Cochrane's equity cost rate approaches and results.**

24   A.   Mr. Cochrane has developed a proxy group of gas distribution companies and

25   employs DCF and CAPM equity cost rate approaches. Mr. Cochrane's equity cost

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[39]   Moody's Investors Service, "Lower Authorized Equity Returns Will Not Hurt Near-Term Credit
       Profiles," March 10, 2015.

1   rate estimates for the Company are summarized on page 2 of Attachment JRW-

2   11. Based on these figures, he concludes that the appropriate equity cost rate for

3   the Company is 10.51%. As I discuss below, there are a number of issues with

4   the inputs, applications, and results of his equity cost rate models.

5 **Q. What issues do you have with the Company's cost of capital position?**

6 A.   The primary rate of return issues in this case are the appropriate capital structure

7   and ROE for the Company.

8   Capital Structure - The Company has proposed a capital structure that includes a

9   common equity ratio (50.15%) that is higher than the average common equity

10   ratios employed by the proxy group. Hence, as a result, I am employing a capital

11   structure with a common equity ratio of 49.21% which was approved in the

12   Company's last rate case.

13   DCF Approach – Mr. Cochrane and I have both employed the traditional constant-

14   growth DCF model. Mr. Cochrane has also used a multi-stage growth version of

15   the model. There are several errors in Mr. Cochrane's DCF analyses: (1) he has

16   exclusively used the overly optimistic and upwardly biased EPS growth rate

17   forecasts of Wall Street analysts and *Value Line*; (2) he has combined abnormally

18   high *Value Line* projected EPSs for his proxy companies, computed from a three-

19   year base period, with three-to-five-year projected growth rates of Yahoo and

20   Zack's; and (3) his terminal growth rate of 5.17% in his multi-stage DCF model is

21   inflated, does not reflect the prospective economic growth in the U.S., and is about

22   100 basis points above the projected long-term GDP growth.

1   CAPM Approach – The CAPM approach requires an estimate of the risk-free

2   interest rate, beta, and the market or risk premium. There are several issues with

3   Mr. Cochrane's overstated market risk premium of 12.19%. First, the 12.19%

4   market risk premium is much larger than: (1) indicated by historic stock and bond

5   return data; and (2) found in the published studies and surveys of the market risk

6   premium. Second, the 12.19% market risk premium is based on totally unrealistic

7   assumptions of future economic and earnings growth and stock returns. To

8   compute his market risk premium, Mr. Cochrane has applied the DCF to the S&P

9   500 and employed analysts' three-to-five-year earnings per share ("EPS") growth-

10   rate projections as a growth rate to compute an expected market return and market

11   risk premiums As I demonstrate later in my testimony, the EPS growth-rate

12   projection of 11.45% used for the S&P 500 and the resulting expected market

13   return and market risk premium include totally unrealistic assumptions regarding

14   future economic and earnings growth and stock returns.

15   Flotation Costs - Mr. Cochrane's recommendation includes an adjustment of

16   0.11% for equity flotation costs. Yet, Mr. Cochrane has not identified any flotation

17   costs that have been paid by EnergyNorth. Therefore, the Company should not be

18   rewarded with a higher ROE that includes flotation costs when the Company has

19   not paid any such costs. Furthermore, the Commission has traditionally not

20   allowed flotation costs.

21   Company Size – Mr. Cochrane's ROE recommendation also includes a

22   consideration of a size premium for the Company. However, as I show, any such

1   premiums for size is not appropriate for a regulated public utility. In addition, the

2   Commission has traditionally not allowed a size premium.

3   These issues are discussed below.

4

5   **A.   The Company's DCF Approach**

6

7 **Q. Please summarize Mr. Cochrane's DCF estimates.**

8 A. On pages 12-22 of his testimony and in Attachments JC-4 - JC-5, Mr. Cochrane

9   develops an equity cost rate by applying the DCF model to his proxy group. Mr.

10   Cochrane's DCF results are summarized in Panel A of page 2 of Attachment JRW-

11   9. He uses constant-growth and multistage growth DCF models. Mr. Cochrane uses

12   three dividend yield measures (30, 90, and 180 days) in his DCF models. In his

13   constant-growth DCF models, Mr. Cochrane has relied on the forecasted EPS

14   growth rates of Zacks, Yahoo Finance, and *Value Line*. His multi-stage DCF

15   model uses analysts' EPS growth rate forecasts as a short-term growth rate and his

16   projection of GDP growth of 5.17% as the long-term growth rate. For all three

17   models, he reports Mean Low, Mean, and Mean High results.

18

19 **Q. What are the issues in Mr. Cochrane's DCF analyses?**

20 A. The primary issues in Mr. Cochrane's DCF analyses are: (1) his exclusive use of

21   the overly optimistic and upwardly biased EPS growth rate forecasts of Wall Street

22   analysts and *Value Line*; (2) he has combined abnormally high *Value Line*

23   projected EPSs for his proxy companies, computed from a three-year base period,

1   with three-to-five-year projected growth rates of Yahoo and Zack's; and (3) his

2   terminal growth rate of 5.17% in his multi-stage DCF model is inflated, does not

3   reflect the prospective economic growth in the U.S., and is about 100 basis points

4   above the projected long-term GDP growth.

5

6   1.   Analysts' EPS Growth Rate Forecasts

7

8 **Q. Please discuss Mr. Cochrane's exclusive reliance on the projected growth**

9   **rates of Wall Street analysts and *Value Line.***

10 A. It seems highly unlikely that investors today would rely exclusively on the EPS

11   growth rate forecasts of Wall Street analysts and ignore other growth rate measures

12   in arriving at their expected growth rates for equity investments. As I previously

13   indicated, the appropriate growth rate in the DCF model is the dividend growth

14   rate, not the earnings growth rate. Hence, consideration must be given to other

15   indicators of growth, including historical prospective dividend growth, internal

16   growth, as well as projected earnings growth. In addition, a recent study by

17   Lacina, Lee, and Xu (2011) has shown that analysts' long-term earnings growth

18   rate forecasts are not more accurate at forecasting future earnings than naïve

19   random walk forecasts of future earnings.[40] As such, the weight given to analysts'

20   projected EPS growth rates should be limited. And finally, and most significantly,

21   it is well-known that the long-term EPS growth rate forecasts of Wall Street

---

[40] M. Lacina, B. Lee and Z. Xu, *Advances in Business and Management Forecasting (Vol. 8),* Kenneth D. Lawrence, Ronald K. Klimberg (ed.), Emerald Group Publishing Limited, pp.77-101

1   securities analysts are overly optimistic and upwardly biased.[41] Hence, using these

2   growth rates as a DCF growth rate produces an overstated equity cost rate. A

3   recent study by Easton and Sommers (2007) found that optimism in analysts'

4   earnings growth rate forecasts leads to an upward bias in estimates of the cost of

5   equity capital of almost 3.0 percentage points.[42] Therefore, exclusive reliance on

6   these forecasts for a DCF growth rate results in failure of one the basic inputs in

7   the equation. In addition, as noted above, a study by Szakmary, Conover, and

8   Lancaster (2008) discovered that the three-to-five-year EPS growth rate forecasts

9   of *Value Line*'s to be significantly higher than the EPS growth rates that these

10   companies subsequently achieved.[43]

11

12   **Q. Have changes in regulations impacting Wall Street analysts and their research**

13   **impacted the upward bias in their projected EPS growth rates?**

14   A. No. A number of the studies I have cited above demonstrate that the upward bias

15   has continued despite changes in regulations and reporting requirements over the

16   past two decades. This observation is highlighted by a 2010 McKinsey study

17   entitled "Equity Analysts: Still Too Bullish," which involved a study of the

18   accuracy of analysts' long-term EPS growth rate forecasts. The authors conclude

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[41]   See references in footnotes 13-16.

[42]   Easton, P., & Sommers, G. (2007). Effect of analysts' optimism on estimates of the expected rate of return implied by earnings forecasts. *Journal of Accounting Research*, 45(5), 983–1015.

[43]   Szakmary, A., Conover, C., & Lancaster, C. (2008). "An Examination of *Value Line*'s Long-Term Projections," *Journal of Banking & Finance*, May 2008, pp. 820-833.

1   that after a decade of stricter regulation, analysts' long-term earnings forecasts

2   continue to be excessively optimistic. They made the following observation:[44]

3   Alas, a recently completed update of our work only reinforces
4   this view—despite a series of rules and regulations, dating to
5   the last decade, that were intended to improve the quality of the
6   analysts' long-term earnings forecasts, restore investor
7   confidence in them, and prevent conflicts of interest. For
8   executives, many of whom go to great lengths to satisfy Wall
9   Street's expectations in their financial reporting and long-term
10   strategic moves, this is a cautionary tale worth remembering.
11   This pattern confirms our earlier findings that analysts typically
12   lag behind events in revising their forecasts to reflect new
13   economic conditions. When economic growth accelerates, the
14   size of the forecast error declines; when economic growth
15   slows, it increases. So as economic growth cycles up and down,
16   the actual earnings S&P 500 companies report occasionally
17   coincide with the analysts' forecasts, as they did, for example,
18   in 1988, from 1994 to 1997, and from 2003 to 2006. *Moreover,*
19   *analysts have been persistently overoptimistic for the past 25*
20   *years, with estimates ranging from 10 to 12 percent a year,*
21   *compared with actual earnings growth of 6 percent. Over this*
22   *time frame, actual earnings growth surpassed forecasts in only*
23   *two instances, both during the earnings recovery following a*
24   *recession. On average, analysts' forecasts have been almost*
25   *100 percent too high.*
26
27   This is the same observation made in a *Bloomberg Businessweek* article.[45] The

28   author concluded:

29
30   **The bottom line:** *Despite reforms intended to improve Wall*
31   *Street research, stock analysts seem to be promoting an overly*
32   *rosy view of profit prospects.*
33
34
35

---

44   Marc H. Goedhart, Rishi Raj, and Abhishek Saxena, "Equity Analysts, Still Too Bullish,"
      McKinsey on Finance, pp. 14-17, (Spring 2010) (emphasis added).

45   Roben Farzad, "For Analysts, Things Are Always Looking Up," *Bloomberg Businessweek* (June
      10, 2010), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2010-06-10/for-analysts-things-are-always-
      looking-up.

1   2.   *Value Line* Projected EPS Growth Rate

2

3

4   **Q. Please discuss Mr. Cochrane's use of *Value Line's* projected EPS growth**

5   **rates.**

6   A. Table 5 shows Mr. Cochrane's DCF growth rates from Yahoo, Zacks, and *Value*

7   *Line*. The Yahoo and Zacks growth rates are the average of analysts' three-to-

8   five-year projected growth rates compiled by Yahoo and Zacks. *Value Line* uses

9   a different approach in estimating projected growth. *Value Line* projects growth

10   from a three-year base period – 2016-2018 – to a projected three-year period for

11   the period 2023-2025. Using this approach, the three-year based period can have

12   a significant impact on the *Value L*ine growth rate if this base period includes years

13   with abnormally high or low earnings. For most of the eight proxy companies, the

14   *Value* Line projected EPS growth rates are larger than the average of the Yahoo

15   and Zacks growth rates, and especially so for NiSource ("NI").

16   **Table 5**

17   **Mr. Cochran's DCF Growth Rates**

Company	*Value Line*	Zacks	Yahoo
Atmos Energy	7.00%	7.20%	7.15%
Chesapeake Utilities	9.00%	NA	4.74%
NiSource Inc.	13.50%	5.30%	4.89%
New Jersey Resources	2.00%	6.00%	6.00%
ONE Gas Inc.	6.50%	5.50%	5.00%
South Jersey Inds.	12.50%	10.20%	10.20%
Spire Inc.	5.50%	4.70%	4.67%
Southwest Gas	8.00%	6.00%	8.20%
Mean	8.00%	6.41%	6.36%

                 Source - Cochran Attachment JC-4, page 1.

18

19   **Q. What skews *Value Line*'s growth rates?**

20   A. *Value Line's* data includes a projected EPS growth rate of 13.5% for NI as shown

21   in Table 5; by any measure, NI's data is an outlier. Panel A of Table 6 shows that

1   *Value Line* projected EPS growth rate of 13.5% is from a three-year base period –

2   2017-2019 – to project growth for three-year period of 2023-2025. Panel B of

3   Table 6 shows how the 13.5% is determined. The 13.5% represents the growth

4   from $1.00 (the average of NI's EPS for 2017, 2018, and 2019 EPS figures of

5   $0.39, $1.30, and $1.32) to the projected EPS of $2.15 in the 2023-25 period. This

6   13.5% growth rate is inflated by including the abnormally low 2017 EPS figure of

7   $0.39 in the three-year base period (2017-19). The projected growth rate is 13.5%

8   over the six-year period.

9   **Table 6**
10 **NI's *Value Line* Projected EPS Growth Rate**
11 **Panel A**

ANNUAL RATES of change (per sh)	Past 10 Yrs.	Past 5 Yrs.	Est'd '17-'19 to '23-'25
Revenues	-7.0%	-5.5%	4.0%
"Cash Flow"	-2.0%	-5.0%	8.0%
Earnings	-1.0%	-8.0%	13.5%
Dividends	-2.0%	-5.0%	7.5%
Book Value	-3.0%	-7.0%	5.0%

12
13 **Panel B**

NiSource	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021	2023-25
Earnings Per Share	0.39	1.30	1.32	1.30	1.45	2.15
3 Year Base and Projected Periods	2017-19					2023-25
Base and Projected EPS Figures	1.00					2.15
Base Period to Projected Period Growth Rate		13.5%				

14
15 Source: See Attachment JRW-9, page 4.
16
17
18   3. The GDP Growth Rate in the Multi-Stage DCF Analysis

19

20 **Q. Please discuss Mr. Cochrane's multi-stage DCF analysis.**

21 A. Mr. Cochrane has employed a multi-stage growth DCF model; (1) the first-stage

22   is the average projected analyst growth rate of Wall Street analysts as published

23   by Yahoo Finance, Zacks, and *Value Line;* and (2) the terminal stage is his

1   projected measure of long-term GDP growth. He uses a long-term nominal GDP

2   growth rate of 5.17% which is based on (1) a real GDP growth rate of 3.21% which

3   is calculated over the 1929-2019 time period and (2) an inflation rate of 1.96%.

4

5   Q. **What are the primary errors with Mr. Cochrane's multi-stage DCF analysis?**

6   A   There are two primary errors with Mr. Cochrane's multi-stage DCF analysis; (1) the

7   first-stage DCF growth rate is the average projected EPS growth rate from Wall

8   Street analysis which, as discussed above, are overly optimistic and upwardly biased;

9   and (2) the long-term GDP growth rate is based on historical GDP growth and is

10   about 100 basis points above long-term projections of GDP growth.

11

12   Q. **Please identify the errors with Mr. Cochrane's projected long-term GDP**

13   **growth rate of 5.17%.**

14   A. There are two major errors in this analysis. First, Mr. Cochrane has not provided any

15   theoretical or empirical support that long-term GDP growth is a reasonable proxy for

16   the expected growth rate of the companies in his proxy group. The second error is

17   the magnitude of Mr. Cochrane's long-term GDP growth rate estimate of 5.17%. On

18   page 1 of Attachment JRW-10 of my testimony, I provide an analysis of GDP growth

19   since 1960. Since 1960, nominal GDP has grown at a compounded rate of 6.28%.

20   Whereas GDP has grown at a compounded rate of 6.28% since 1960, economic

21   growth in the U.S. has slowed considerably in recent decades. Page 2 of

22   Attachment JRW-10 provides the nominal annual GDP growth rates over the 1961

23   to 2020 time period. Nominal GDP growth grew from 6.0% to over 12% from the

71

1   1960s to the early 1980s due in large part to inflation and higher prices. Despite

2   an uptick during the mid-2000s, and notwithstanding the -2.3% growth rate in

3   2020, the annual nominal GDP growth rates have declined to the 4.0% range over

4   the past decade.[46]

5   The components of nominal GDP growth are real GDP growth and inflation.

6   Page 3 of Attachment JRW-10 shows annual real GDP growth rate over the 1961

7   to 2020 time period. Real GDP growth has gradually declined from the 5.0% to

8   6.0% range in the 1960s to the 2.0% range during the most recent five-year period,

9   notwithstanding the -3.5% growth rate in 2020. The second component of nominal

10   GDP growth is inflation. Page 4 of Attachment JRW-10 shows inflation as

11   measured by the annual growth rate in the Consumer Price Index (CPI) over the

12   1960 to 2020 time period. The large increase in prices from the late 1960s to the

13   early 1980s is readily evident. Equally evident is the rapid decline in inflation

14   during the 1980s as inflation declined from above 10% to about 4%. Since that

15   time inflation has gradually declined and has been in the 2.0% range or below over

16   the past five years.

17   The graphs on pages 2, 3, and 4 of Attachment JRW-10 provide very clear

18   evidence of the decline in nominal GDP as well as its components, real GDP, and

19   inflation, in recent decades. To gauge the magnitude of the decline in nominal

20   GDP growth, Table 7 and page 5 of Attachment JRW-10 provide the compounded

21   GDP growth rates for 10-, 20-, 30-, 40- and 50- years. Whereas the 50-year

---

[46]   Nominal GDP did increase to 5.5% in 2018. However, this is a one-time boost associated with the 2017 decrease in income taxes.

1   compounded GDP growth rate is 6.28%, there has been a monotonic and significant

2   decline in nominal GDP growth over subsequent 10-year intervals, especially in the

3   most recent 10-year interval. These figures clearly suggest that nominal GDP growth

4   in recent decades has slowed and that a growth rate in the range of 3.50% to 4.0% is

5   more appropriate today for the U.S. economy. Mr. Cochrane's long-term GDP

6   growth rate of 5.17% is clearly inflated.

7   **Table 7**
8   **Historic GDP Growth Rates**

10-Year Average	3.40%
20-Year Average	3.63%
30-Year Average	4.27%
40-Year Average	5.10%
50-Year Average	6.12%

9
10
11   **Q. Are the lower GDP growth rates of recent decades consistent with the**

12   **forecasts of GDP growth?**

13   A. A lower range is also consistent with long-term GDP forecasts. There are several

14   forecasts of annual GDP growth that are available from economists and

15   government agencies. These are listed in Panel B of on page 5 of Attachment

16   JRW-10. The mean 10-year nominal GDP growth forecast (as of March 2020) by

17   economists in the recent *Survey of Financial Forecasters* is 4.30 percent.[47] The

18   federal Energy Information Administration (EIA), in its projections used in

19   preparing *Annual Energy Outlook,* forecasts long-term GDP growth of 4.2 percent

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[47]   https://www.philadelphiafed.org/research-and-data/real-time-center/survey-of-professional-forecasters/

1   for the period 2019–2050.[48] The Congressional Budget Office (CBO), in its

2   forecasts for the period 2019 to 2029, projects a nominal GDP growth rate of 3.8

3   percent.[49] Finally, the Social Security Administration (SSA), in its Annual

4   OASDI Report, provides a projection of nominal GDP from 2020–2095.[50] SSA's

5   projected growth GDP growth rate over this period is 4.1 percent. Overall, these

6   forecasts suggest long-term GDP growth rate in the 4.0–4.3 percent range. The

7   trends and projections indicating slower GDP growth indicate that Mr. Cochrane's

8   GDP growth rate of 5.17% is inflated.

9

10   **Q. Does Mr. Cochrane provide any reasons why he has ignored the well-known**

11   **long-term GDP forecasts of the CBO, SSA, and EIA?**

12   A. No.

13

14   **Q. In your opinion, what is wrong with Mr. Cochrane's basing his real GDP**

15   **forecast on historic data and ignoring the well-known long-term GDP**

16   **forecasts of the CBO, SSA, and EIA?**

17   A. In developing a DCF growth rate for his constant-growth DCF analysis, Mr.

18   Cochrane has ignored <u>historic</u> EPS, DPS, and BVPS data and relied solely on the

19   long-term EPS growth rate <u>projections</u> of Wall Street analysts and *Value Line*. At

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[48]   U.S. Energy Information Administration, *Annual Energy Outlook 2020*, Table: Macroeconomic Indicators.

[49]   Congressional Budget Office, *The 2020 Long-Term Budget Outlook*, June 25, 2020.

[50]   Social Security Administration, *2020 Annual Report of the Board of Trustees of the Old-Age, Survivors, and Disability Insurance (OASDI) Program*, Table VI.G4, (July 1, 2020), The 4.1% growth rate is the growth in projected GDP from $22,341 trillion in 2020 to $450,425 trillion in 2095.

1   the same time, however, in developing a terminal DCF growth rate for his multi-

2   stage growth DCF analysis, Mr. Cochrane ignores the well-known long-term real

3   GDP growth rate underline forecasts of the CBO and EIA and relies solely on historic data

4   going back to 1929.   Simply put, he is inconsistent in his methodology.

5

6   **B.**   **CAPM Approach**

7

8   **Q. Please discuss Mr. Cochrane's CAPM.**

9   A. On pages 21-26 of his testimony and in Attachments JC-6 through JC-8, Mr.

10   Cochrane estimates an equity cost rate by applying a CAPM model to his proxy

11   group. The CAPM approach requires an estimate of the risk-free interest rate, beta,

12   and the equity risk premium. Mr. Cochrane uses: (1) a current (30-day average,

13   90-day average, and 180-day average) 30-Year Treasury bond yields of 1.47%,

14   1.39%, and 1.79%; (2) an average *Value Line* Beta of 0.84; and (3) a market risk

15   premium of 12.19%. Mr. Cochrane's CAPM results are summarized on page 1 of

16   Attachment JC-8.

17

18   **Q. What are the errors in Mr. Cochrane's CAPM analysis?**

19   A. The primary issue is Mr. Cochrane's expected market risk premium of 12.19%.

20

21   1. Market Risk Premium

22

23   **Q. What are the errors in Mr. Cochrane's CAPM analyses?**

1   A. The primary error in Mr. Cochrane's CAPM analysis is the market premium of

2   12.19%.

3

4   **Q. Please assess Mr. Cochrane's market risk premium derived from applying the**

5   **DCF model to the S&P 500 using *Value Line* EPS growth rates.**

6   A. As shown in Table 8, Mr. Cochrane computes a market risk premium of 12.19%

7   by: (1) calculating an expected stock market return by applying the DCF model to

8   the S&P 500; and, then (2) subtracting the current 30-year Treasury bond yield.

9   Mr. Cochrane's estimated expected market return is 13.66% (using *Value Line*

10   EPS growth rate estimates). Mr. Cochrane also uses (1) a dividend yield of 2.21%

11   and an expected DCF growth rate of 11.45%. The market risk premium is then

12   computed as the expected stock market return minus the risk-free interest rate

13   (13.66%-1.47% =12.19%).

14   **Table 8**

15   **CAPM Market Risk Premium Calculation**

Dividend Yield	2.21%
+ Expected EPS Growth	11.45%
= Expected Market Return	13.66%
- Risk-Free Rate	1.47%
= Market Risk Premium	12.19%

16

17   **Q. How did Mr. Cochrane err when analyzing market premium?**

18   A. The error is that Mr. Cochrane computed the expected market return using the

19   DCF model with the growth rate being the projected 5-year EPS growth rate from

20   *Value Line*. Simply stated, the expected EPS growth rates and the associated

1 expected stock market return and resulting market risk premium are totally

2 unrealistic and defy economic logic.

3

4 **Q. Is Mr. Cochrane's market risk premium of 12.19% reflective of the market**

5 **risk premiums found in published studies and surveys?**

6 A. No. It is well in excess of the market risk premiums: (1) found in studies of the

7 market risk premiums by leading academic scholars; (2) produced by analyses of

8 historic stock and bond returns; and (3) found in surveys of financial professionals.

9 Page 5 of Attachment JRW-8 provides the results of over thirty market risk

10 premiums studies from the past fifteen years. Historic stock and bond returns

11 suggest a market risk premium in the 4.5% to 7.0% range, depending on whether

12 one uses arithmetic or geometric mean returns. There have been many studies

13 using expected return (also called *ex ante*) models, and their market risk premiums

14 results vary from as low as 2.0% to as high as 7.31%. Finally, the market risk

15 premiums developed from surveys of analysts, companies, financial professionals,

16 and academics suggest lower market risk premiums, in a range of from 1.85% to

17 5.70%. The bottom line is that there is no support in historic return data, surveys,

18 academic studies, or reports for investment firms for a market risk premium as

19 high as those used by Mr. Cochrane.

20

21 **Q. Please once again address the issues with analysts' as well as *Value Line*'s**

22 **EPS growth rate forecasts.**

23 A. The key point is that Mr. Cochrane's CAPM market risk premium methodology is

1   based entirely on the concept that *Value Line*'s projections of companies' EPS

2   growth rates reflect investors' expected *long-term* EPS growth for those

3   companies. However, this seems highly unrealistic given the research on these

4   projections. As noted above, the EPS growth rate forecasts of *Value Line*, such as

5   those used by Mr. Cochrane, have been to be significantly higher than the EPS

6   growth rates that these companies subsequently achieve.[51]

7

8   **Q. Is there other evidence that indicates that Mr. Cochrane's market risk**

9   **premium developed using *Value Line*'s EPS growth rates is excessive?**

10   A. Yes. The fact is that a long-term EPS growth rate of 11.45% is inconsistent with

11   both historic and projected economic and earnings growth in the U.S for several

12   reasons: (1) long-term EPS and economic growth is less than one-half of Mr.

13   Cochrane's projected EPS growth rate of 11.45%; (2) as discussed below, long-

14   term EPS and GDP growth are directly linked; and (3) more recent trends in GDP

15   growth, as well as projections of GDP growth, suggest slower economic and

16   earnings growth in the future.

17   Long-Term Historic EPS and GDP Growth have been in the 6%-7% Range –

18   In Attachment JRW-10, I performed a study of the growth in nominal GDP, S&P

19   500 stock price appreciation, and S&P 500 EPS and DPS growth since 1960. The

20   results are provided on page 1 of Attachment JRW-10, and a summary is shown

21   in Table 9.

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[51] Szakmary, A., Conover, C., & Lancaster, C. (2008). "An Examination of *Value Line*'s Long-Term Projections," *Journal of Banking & Finance*, May 2008, pp. 820-833.

Table 9
GDP, S&P 500 Stock Price, EPS, and DPS Growth
1960-Present

Nominal GDP	**6.28**
S&P 500 Stock Price	**7.20**
S&P 500 EPS	**6.53**
S&P 500 DPS	**5.75**
Average	**6.44**

The results show that the historical long-run growth rates for GDP, S&P EPS, and S&P DPS are in the 6% to 7% range. By comparison, Mr. Cochrane's long-run growth rate projection of 11.45% is at best overstated. This estimate suggests that companies in the U.S. would be expected to: (1) increase their growth rate of EPS by 100% in the future, and (2) maintain that growth indefinitely in an economy that is expected to grow at about one-third of his projected growth rates.

There is a Direct Link Between Long-Term EPS and GDP Growth - The results in Attachment JRW-10 and Table 9 show that historically there has been a close link between long-term EPS and GDP growth rates. Brad Cornell of the California Institute of Technology published a study on GDP growth, earnings growth, and equity returns. He finds that long-term EPS growth in the U.S. is directly related to GDP growth, with GDP growth providing an upward limit on EPS growth. In addition, he finds that long-term stock returns are determined by long-term earnings growth. He concludes with the following observations:[52]

> The long-run performance of equity investments is fundamentally
> linked to growth in earnings. Earnings growth, in turn, depends on

---

[52] Bradford Cornell, "Economic Growth and Equity Investing," *Financial Analysts Journal* (January-February 2010), p. 63.

1   growth in real GDP. This article demonstrates that both theoretical

2   research and empirical research in development economics suggest

3   relatively strict limits on future growth. In particular, real GDP

4   growth in excess of 3 percent in the long run is highly unlikely in

5   the developed world. In light of ongoing dilution in earnings per

6   share, this finding implies that investors should anticipate real

7   returns on U.S. common stocks to average no more than about 4–5

8   percent in real terms.

9   <u>The Trend and Projections Indicate Slower GDP Growth in the Future</u> - The

10   components of nominal GDP growth are real GDP growth and inflation. As

11   discussed above and shown on pages 2-5 of Attachment JRW-10, real GDP growth

12   has gradually declined from the 5.0% to 6.0% range in the 1960s to the 2.0% range

13   during the recent years. In addition, inflation as measured by the annual growth

14   rate in the CPI has declined and has been in the 2.0% range or below over the past

15   five years. This decline in nominal GDP growth was shown in Table 7 and

16   suggests that a figure in the range of 4.0% to 4.5% is more appropriate today for the

17   U.S. economy.

18   <u>Long-Term GDP Projections also Indicate Slower GDP Growth in the Future</u>

19   Likewise, as discussed above, projections of nominal GDP by various government

20   and industry agencies including the EIA, CBO, and SSA project growth rates for

21   long-term GDP in the 4.0% - 4.3% range. Mr. Cochrane's market risk premium

22   presumes a projected EPS growth rate of 11.45% that is almost three times

23   projected GDP growth. Given the connection between EPS and GDP growth rates,

24   this defies economic logic.

25

1 **Q. What fundamental factors have led to the decline in prospective GDP**

2   **growth?**

3 A. As addressed in a study by the consulting firm McKinsey & Co., two factors drive

4   real GDP growth over time: (a) the number of workers in the economy

5   (employment); and (2) the productivity of those workers (usually defined as output

6   per hour).[53] According to McKinsey, real GDP growth over the past 50 years was

7   driven by population and productivity growth which grew at compound annual

8   rates of 1.7% and 1.8%, respectively.

9   However, global economic growth is projected to slow significantly in the

10   years to come. The primary factor leading to the decline is slow growth in

11   employment (working-age population), which results from slower population

12   growth and longer life expectancy. McKinsey estimates that employment growth

13   will slow to 0.3% over the next fifty years. They conclude that even if productivity

14   remains at the rapid rate of the past fifty years of 1.8%, real GDP growth will fall

15   by 40 percent to 2.1%.

16
17 **Q. Please provide more insights into the relationship between S&P 500 EPS and**

18   **GDP growth.**

19 A. Figure 8 shows the average annual growth rates for GDP and the S&P 500 EPS

20   since 1960. The one very apparent difference between the two is that the S&P 500

21   EPS growth rates are much more volatile than the GDP growth rates, when

22   compared using the relatively short, and somewhat arbitrary, annual conventions

---

[53] McKinsey & Co., "Can Long-Term Growth be Saved?", McKinsey Global Institute, (Jan. 2015).

1   used in these data.[54] Volatility aside, however, it is clear that over the medium to

2   long run, S&P 500 EPS growth does not outpace GDP growth.

Figure 8
Average Annual Growth Rates
GDP and S&P 500 EPS
1960-2020

Data Sources: GDPA - http://research.stlouisfed.org/fred2/series/GDPA/downloaddata.
S&P EPS - http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/

10   A fuller understanding of the relationship between GDP and S&P 500 EPS

11   growth requires consideration of several other factors.

12   Corporate Profits are Constrained by GDP – Milton Friedman, the noted

13   economist, warned investors and others not to expect corporate profit growth to

14   sustainably exceed GDP growth, stating, "Beware of predictions that earnings can

15   grow faster than the economy for long periods. When earnings are exceptionally

---

[54] Timing conventions such as years and quarters are needed for measurement and benchmarking but are somewhat arbitrary. In reality, economic growth and profit accrual occur on continuous bases. A 2014 study evaluated the timing relationship between corporate profits and nominal GDP growth. The authors found that aggregate accounting earnings growth is a leading indicator of the GDP growth with a quarter-ahead forecast horizon. *See* Yaniv Konchitchki and Panos N. Patatoukas, "Accounting Earnings and Gross Domestic Product," *Journal of Accounting and Economics* 57 (2014), pp. 76–88.

1   high, they don't just keep booming."[55]   Friedman also noted in the *Fortune*

2   interview that profits must move back down to their traditional share of GDP. In

3   Table 10, below, I show that currently the aggregate net income levels for the S&P

4   500 companies, using 2019 figures, represent 6.53% of nominal GDP.

5   **Table 10**
6   **S&P 500 Aggregate Net Income as a Percent of GDP**

	$ Billion
Aggregate Net Income for S&P 500	**$1,399.46**
2019 Nominal U.S. GDP	**$21,427.10**
Net Income/GDP (%)	**6.53%**

7

8   Data Sources: 2019 Net Income for S&P 500 companies – *Value Line* (March 3, 2020).
9   2019 Nominal GDP – Moody's - https://www.economy.com/united-states/nominal-gross-
10   domestic-product.

11   Short-Term Factors Impact S&P 500 EPS – The growth rates in the S&P 500

12   EPS and GDP can diverge on a year-to-year basis due to short-term factors that

13   impact S&P 500 EPS in a much greater way than GDP. As shown above, S&P

14   EPS growth rates are much more volatile than GDP growth rates. The EPS growth

15   for the S&P 500 companies has been influenced by low labor costs and interest

16   rates, commodity prices, the recovery of different sectors such as the energy and

17   financial sectors, the cut in corporate tax rates, etc. These short-term factors can

18   make it appear that there is a disconnect between the economy and corporate

19   profits.

20   The Differences Between the S&P 500 EPS and GDP – In recent years, as the

21   EPS for the S&P 500 has grown at a faster rate than U.S. nominal GDP, some have

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[55]   Shaun Tully, "Corporate Profits Are Soaring. Here's Why It Can't Last," Fortune, (Dec. 7, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/12/07/corporate-earnings-profit-boom-end/.

1   pointed to the differences between the S&P 500 and GDP.[56] These differences

2   include: (a) corporate profits are about 2/3 manufacturing driven, while GDP is

3   2/3 services driven; (b) consumer discretionary spending accounts for a smaller

4   share of S&P 500 profits (15%) than of GDP (23%); (c) corporate profits are more

5   international-trade driven, while exports minus imports tend to drag on GDP; and

6   (d) S&P 500 EPS is impacted not just by corporate profits but also by share

7   buybacks on the positive side (fewer shares boost EPS) and by share dilution on

8   the negative side (new shares dilute EPS). While these differences may seem

9   significant, it must be remembered that the Income Approach to measure GDP

10   includes corporate profits (in addition to employee compensation and taxes on

11   production and imports) and therefore effectively accounts for the first three

12   factors.[57]

13   The bottom line is that despite the intertemporal short-term differences

14   between S&P 500 EPS and nominal GDP growth, the long-term link between

15   corporate profits and GDP is inevitable.

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[56]   *See* the following studies: Burt White and Jeff Buchbinder, "The S&P and GDP are not the Same Thing," LPL Financial, (Nov. 4, 2014), https://www.businessinsider.com/sp-is-not-gdp-2014-11; Matt Comer, "How Do We Have 18.4% Earnings Growth In A 2.58% GDP Economy?," Seeking Alpha, (Apr. 2018), https://seekingalpha.com/article/4164052-18_4-percent-earnings-growth-2_58-percent-gdp-economy; Shaun Tully, "How on Earth Can Profits Grow at 10% in a 2% Economy?," Fortune, (July 27, 2017), http://fortune.com/2017/07/27/profits-economic-growth/.

[57]   The Income Approach to measuring GDP includes wages, salaries, and supplementary labor income, corporate profits, interest and miscellaneous investment income, farmers' incomes, and income from non-farm unincorporated businesses

1

2 **Q. Please provide addition evidence showing that Mr. Cochrane's S&P 500 EPS**

3   **growth rate of 11.45% is not realistic.**

4 A. Beyond my previous discussion, I have also performed the following analysis of

5   S&P 500 EPS and GDP growth in Table 11 below. Specifically, I started with the

6   2019 aggregate net income for the S&P 500 companies and 2019 nominal GDP

7   for the U.S. As shown in Table 10, the aggregate profit for the S&P 500 companies

8   represented 6.53% of nominal GDP in 2019. In Table 11, I then projected the

9   aggregate net income level for the S&P 500 companies and GDP as of the year

10   2050. For the growth rate for the S&P 500 companies, I used Mr. Cochrane's

11   projected S&P 500 EPS growth rate of 11.45%. As a growth rate for nominal

12   GDP, I used the average of the long-term projected GDP growth rates from SFF,

13   CBO, SSA, and EIA (4.3%, 3.8%, 4.1%, and 4.0%), which is 4.09%. The

14   projected 2050 level for the aggregate net income level for the S&P 500 companies

15   is $40.3 trillion. Over the same period GDP is expected to grow to $74.2 trillion.

16   As such, if the aggregate net income for the S&P 500 grows in accordance with

17   the growth rate used by Mr. Cochrane, and if nominal GDP grows at rates

18   projected by major government agencies, the net income of the S&P 500

19   companies will represent growth from 6.53% of GDP in 2019 to 54.30% of GDP

20   in 2050. Obviously, it is totally implausible for the net income of the S&P 500 to

21   become such a large component of GDP.

22
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Table 11
Projected S&P 500 Earnings and Nominal GDP
2019-2050
S&P 500 Aggregate Net Income as a Percent of GDP

	2019 Value	Growth Rate	No. of Years	2050 Value
Aggregate Net Income for S&P 500	$1,399.46	11.45%	31	$ 40,312.78
2018 Nominal U.S. GDP	$21,427.10	4.09%	31	$ 74,240.80
Net Income/GDP (%)	6.53%			54.30%

5
6 Data Sources: 2019 Aggregate Net Income for S&P 500 companies – *Value Line* (March 3, 2020).
7 2019 Nominal GDP – Moody's - https://www.economy.com/united-states/nominal-gross-domestic-
8   product.
9 S&P 500 EPS Growth Rate - Mr. Cochrane's projected S&P 500 growth rate of 11.45%.
10 Nominal GDP Growth Rate – The average of the long-term projected GDP growth rates from SFF,
11 CBO, SSA, and EIA (4.3%, 3.8%, 4.0%, and 4.1%).

12

13 **Q. Please provide a summary assessment of GDP and S&P 500 EPS growth**

14   **rates.**

15 A. As noted above, the long-term link between corporate profits and GDP is

16   inevitable. The short-term differences in growth between the two has been

17   highlighted by some notable market observers, including Warren Buffet, who

18   indicated that corporate profits as a share of GDP tend to go far higher after periods

19   where they are depressed, and then drop sharply after they have been hovering at

20   historically high levels. In a famous 1999 *Fortune* article, Mr. Buffet made the

21   following observation:[58]

22   You know, someone once told me that New York has more lawyers
23   than people. I think that's the same fellow who thinks profits will
24   become larger than GDP. When you begin to expect the growth of a
25   component factor to forever outpace that of the aggregate, you get into
26   certain mathematical problems. In my opinion, you have to be wildly
27   optimistic to believe that corporate profits as a percent of GDP can,
28   for any sustained period, hold much above 6%. One thing keeping the
29   percentage down will be competition, which is alive and well. In

---

[58] Carol Loomis, "Mr. Buffet on the Stock Market," *Fortune*, (Nov. 22, 1999),
       https://money.cnn.com/magazines/fortune/fortune_archive/1999/11/22/269071/.

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1   addition, there's a public-policy point: If corporate investors, in
2   aggregate, are going to eat an ever-growing portion of the American
3   economic pie, some other group will have to settle for a smaller
4   portion. That would justifiably raise political problems – and in my
5   view a major reslicing of the pie just isn't going to happen.

6   In sum, Mr. Cochrane's long-term S&P 500 EPS growth rate of 11.45% is

7   grossly overstated and has no basis in economic reality. In the end, the big question

8   remains as to whether corporate profits can grow faster than GDP. Jeremy Siegel,

9   the renowned finance professor at the Wharton School of the University of

10   Pennsylvania, believes that going forward, earnings per share can grow about half

11   a point faster than nominal GDP, or about 5.0%, due to the big gains in the

12   technology sector.   But he also believes that sustained EPS growth matching

13   analysts' near-term projections is absurd: "The idea of 8% or 10% or 12% growth

14   is ridiculous. It will not happen."[59]

15
16   Q. Finally, please provide an overall evaluation of Mr. Cochrane's expected

17   stock market return that is used to develop his market risk premium.

18   A. Simply put, the 13.66% expected stock market return is unrealistic. The

19   compounded annual return in the U.S. stock market is about 10% (9.79%

20   according to Damodaran between 1928-2020).[60] Mr. Cochrane's CAPM results

21   assume that return on the U.S. stock market will be over 30% higher in the future

22   than it has been in the past! The extremely high expected stock market return, and

23   the resulting market risk premium and equity cost rate result, is directly related to

---

[59]   Shaun Tully, "Corporate Profits Are Soaring. Here's Why It Can't Last," *Fortune*, (Dec. 7, 2017),
http://fortune.com/2017/12/07/corporate-earnings-profit-boom-end/.

[60]   http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/~adamodar/

1   the 11.45% expected EPS growth rate. A projected growth rate of 11.45% does

2   not reflect economic reality. As noted above, it assumes that S&P 500 companies

3   can grow their earnings in the future at a rate that is triple the expected GDP growth

4   rate.

5

6   **C. Flotation Cost and Size Adjustments**

7

8   **Q. Please discuss Mr. Cochrane's consideration of flotation costs.**

9   A. Mr. Cochrane claims than a flotation cost adjustment of 0.11% is justified to

10   account for flotation costs. However, this is unnecessary for two reasons. First,

11   as indicated in the Company's response to Staff 3-25, there have been no equity

12   infusions into EnergyNorth in the past five years. Second, as stated in the

13   Company's response to Staff 3-14, EnergyNorth has stated that the Company has

14   not paid any flotation costs in the past five years. The responses to Staff 3-14 and

15   3-25 are attached as Attachment JRW-11. And Mr. Cochrane in his testimony has

16   not identified any equity issuances/infusions or flotation costs for EnergyNorth.

17   Therefore, Mr. Cochrane is claiming that the Company deserves additional

18   revenues in the form of a high ROE to account for flotation costs that have not

19   been identified or paid.

20   Beyond this issue, it is commonly argued that a flotation cost adjustment (such

21   as that used by the Company) is necessary to prevent the stock price dilution of

22   the existing shareholders. However, this is incorrect for several reasons:

1   (1)   If an equity flotation cost adjustment is similar to a debt flotation cost

2   adjustment, the fact that the market-to-book ratios for gas distribution companies

3   are over 1.5X actually suggests that there should be a flotation cost *reduction* (and

4   not an increase) to the equity cost rate. This is because when (a) a bond is issued

5   at a price in excess of face or book value, and (b) the difference between its market

6   price and the book value is greater than the flotation or issuance costs, the cost of

7   that debt is lower than the coupon rate of the debt. The amount by which market

8   values of gas distribution companies are in excess of book values is much greater

9   than flotation costs. Hence, if common stock flotation costs were exactly like bond

10   flotation costs, and one was making an explicit flotation cost adjustment to the cost

11   of common equity, the adjustment would be downward;

12   (2)   If a flotation cost adjustment is needed to prevent dilution of existing

13   stockholders' investment, then the reduction of the book value of stockholder

14   investment associated with flotation costs can occur only when a company's stock

15   is selling at a market price at or below its book value. As noted above, gas

16   distribution companies are selling at market prices well in excess of book value.

17   Hence, when new shares are sold, existing shareholders realize an increase in the

18   book value per share of their investment, not a decrease;

19   (3)   Flotation costs consist primarily of the underwriting spread (or fee)

20   rather than out-of-pocket expenses. On a per-share basis, the underwriting spread

21   is the difference between the price the investment banker receives from investors

22   and the price the investment banker pays to the company. These are not expenses

23   that should be recovered through the regulatory process. Furthermore, the

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1   underwriting spread is known to the investors who are buying the new issue of

2   stock, and who are well aware of the difference between the price they are paying

3   to buy the stock and the price that the company is receiving. The offering price

4   which they pay is what matters when investors decide to buy a stock based on its

5   expected return and risk prospects. Therefore, the Company is not entitled to an

6   adjustment to the allowed return to account for those costs; and

7   (4)   Flotation costs, in the form of the underwriting spread, are a form of a

8   transaction cost in the market. They represent the difference between the price

9   paid by investors and the amount received by the issuing company. Whereas

10   EnergyNorth believes that it should be compensated for these transaction costs, it

11   has not accounted for *other* market transaction costs in determining its cost of

12   equity. Most notably, brokerage fees that investors pay when they buy shares in

13   the open market are another market transaction cost. Brokerage fees increase the

14   effective stock price paid by investors to buy shares. If the Company had included

15   these brokerage fees or transaction costs in its DCF analysis, the higher effective

16   stock prices paid for stocks would lead to lower dividend yields and equity cost

17   rates. This would result in a downward adjustment to their DCF equity cost rate.

18   Finally, I would point out that the New Hampshire PUC has found that, lacking

19   any evidence of actual or planned issuances, such costs should not be

20   compensated." *See* Re: Pennichuck Water Works, Inc. 70 NH PUC 850, 863

21   (1985, 70 NH PUC 862).

22

23   **Q. What other adjustments does Mr. Cochrane propose?**

90

1   A. In his assessment of the Company's business risk, Mr. Cochrane claims that

2   EnergyNorth deserves a small size premium.

3

4   **Q. Please review the research on the size effect.**

5   A. Mr. Cochrane justifies the size premium by referring to Duff & Phelps. Duff &

6   Phelps compute a size premium based on the historical stock market returns for

7   companies based on their size. There are numerous errors in using historical

8   market returns to compute risk premiums. These errors provide inflated estimates

9   of expected risk premiums. Among the errors are survivorship bias (only

10   successful companies survive – poor companies do not) and unattainable return

11   bias (the Ibbotson procedure presumes monthly portfolio rebalancing). The net

12   result is that Ibbotson's size premiums are poor measures for risk adjustment to

13   account for the size of a utility.

14   Professor Annie Wong has also tested for a company size premium in

15   utilities and concluded that, unlike industrial stocks, utility stocks do not display a

16   significant company size premium.[61] As explained by Professor Wong, there are

17   several reasons why such a size premium would not be attributable to utilities.

18   Utilities are regulated closely by state and federal agencies and commissions, and

19   hence, their financial performance is monitored on an ongoing basis by both the state

20   and federal governments. In addition, public utilities must gain approval from

21   government entities for common financial transactions such as the sale of securities

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[61]   Annie Wong, "Utility Stocks and the Size Effect: An Empirical Analysis," *Journal of the Midwest Finance Association*, pp. 95-101, (1993).

1   (or the issuance of debt).   Furthermore, unlike for their industrial counterparts,

2   accounting standards and reporting are fairly standardized for public utilities.

3   Finally, a utility's earnings are predetermined to a certain degree through the

4   ratemaking process in which performance is reviewed by state commissions and

5   other stakeholders.   Overall, in terms of regulation, government oversight,

6   performance review, accounting standards, and information disclosure, utilities are

7   much different than industrials, which could account for the lack of a company size

8   premium.

9

10   **Q. Please discuss the research on the company size premium in estimating the**

11   **cost of equity capital.**

12   A. As noted, there are errors in using historical market returns to compute risk

13   premiums. With respect to the small firm premium, Richard Roll (1983) found that

14   one-half of the historic return premium for small companies disappears once biases

15   are eliminated and historic returns are properly computed. The error arises from

16   the assumption of monthly portfolio rebalancing and the serial correlation in

17   historic small firm returns.[62]

18   In a more recent paper, Ang (2017) tested for a size effect over the time

19   period 1981-2016.[63] He used value-weighted size-based decile returns obtained

20   from French's Data Library, with the smallest size-based decile as a proxy for

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[62] *See* Richard Roll, "On Computing Mean Returns and the Small Firm Premium," *Journal of
Financial Economics*, pp. 371-86, (1983).

[63] Clifford Ang, "The Absence of a Size Effect Relevant to the Cost of Equity," June 9, 2017,
available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2984599.

1   small stocks and the largest size-based decile as a proxy for large stocks. He found

2   that small stocks underperformed large stocks by 12% over the period 1981 to

3   2016. He claims that this result is consistent with other studies that the size effect

4   vanished in the 1980s. He concluded with the following:[64]

5

> 6   My review of the evidence and analysis strongly suggests the
> 7   proponents of the size effect are nowhere close to meeting their
> 8   burden. I find that investors use the CAPM and do not demand
> 9   compensation for size when setting their required rate of return,
> 10   which directly contradicts the need to augment or modify the CAPM
> 11   Cost of Equity with a size premium. I show that small stocks do not
> 12   outperform large stocks, which calls into question the very premise
> 13   of a size effect. I also find that studies finding a size effect suffer from
> 14   the twin fatal flaws of lacking a theoretical basis and data mining,
> 15   which are very difficult, if not impossible, to overcome. Given the
> 16   above, practitioners should abandon the practice of augmenting or
> 17   modifying the CAPM Cost of Equity with a size premium.

18

19   **Q. What other evidence can you provide regarding the size effect?**

20   A. Professor Damodaran, the New York University valuation scholar, provides a

21   thorough analysis of the company size effect, which he terms the small firm or cap

22   premium. Figure 9 traces the small firm premium over the 1927-2014 time

23   period.[65] Damodaran has studied the issue for years and makes a number of

24   observations on the size premium or effect:

25   (1) the effect has largely disappeared since 1980, which is the year the Banz article

26   was published;[66]

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[64] *Ibid.*, p. 6.

[65] Damodaran – "The Small Cap Premium_ Where is the beef," Business Valuation Review: Winter 2015, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 152-157, 2015

[66] The 1980 article by Rolf Banz was the first study that reported the existence of a small company premium.

1   (2) the small firm premium tends to come and go over time;

2   (3) the small firm premium tends to be associated with the January effect (small

3   companies only earn abnormal returns in the first two weeks of January);

4   (4) the small cap premium seems to actually be a microcap premium, as it

5   disappears when companies with market capitalizations below $5 million are

6   removed;

7   (5) Damodaran does not find a small cap premium when he estimates a small firm

8   required return;

9   (6) he has never used a small cap premium when valuing small companies; and

10   (7) he blames three factors for some analysts' continued use of a small cap

11   premium: (i) intuition (it seems smaller companies should be riskier), (ii) inertia

12   (individuals and institutions are slow to change and to adopt new ideas); and (iii)

13   bias (analysts prefer higher discount rates and lower valuations).

14   **Figure 9**
15   **The Small Firm Premium**
16   **1927-2014**

17

18   Source: Aswath Damodaran, "The Small Cap Premium - Where is the beef,"
19   Business Valuation Review: Winter 2015, Vol. 34, No. 4, pp. 152-157, 2015.
20

21

94

1   **Q. Please summarize your evidence on the small size premium.**

2   A. Mr. Cochrane has claimed that the Company deserves an incremental return due

3   to its small size. However, he has not performed any empirical studies to support

4   his contention that the Company is riskier due to its small size, and he does not

5   point to any independent reports to support his claim. The size effect is usually

6   associated with Duff & Phelps annual stock return study where they compute so-

7   called size premiums based on the historical stock market returns for companies

8   where size is measured by market capitalizations. As discussed above, the

9   existence of a size premium in the stock market in an ongoing debate in investment

10   circles, and many believe that it has disappeared over time.   In addition, there is

11   evidence that no such size premium exists for regulated public utilities. As such,

12   the Commission should reject the Company's request to have a ROE adder for its

13   small size in the absence of any study that supports this claim.

14

15 **Q. Does this conclude your testimony?**

16 A. Yes, it does.