DR 97-251
NEW ENGLAND POWER COMPANY
PETITION TO TRANSFER FACILITIES AND RELATED REQUESTS
Order Approving Transfer and Granting Related Requests
O R D E R N O. 22,982
July 20, 1998
APPEARANCES: Thomas Robinson, Esq., for New
England Power Company; Carlos A. Gavilondo, Esq., for
Granite State Electric Company; Donna C. Sharkey, Esq., for
Enron Capital & Trade Resources, Inc.; Ann Ross, Esq.,for
the Retail Merchants Association of New Hampshire (RMA);
Stephen J. Judge, Associate Attorney General, for the
Governor's Office of Energy and Community Services; Michael
Holmes, Esq., for the Office of Consumer Advocate; and
Robert J. Frank, Esq., for the Staff of the New Hampshire
Public Utilities Commission.
I. INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY
This order approves a request by New England Power
Company (NEP) for authority to transfer its New Hampshire
hydro electric facilities in a proposed transaction with
USGen New England, Inc. (USGenNE) pursuant to which NEP has
agreed to sell substantially all of its non-nuclear
generating assets. As explained below, the Commission finds
that NEP's proposal meets the public good standard of RSA
374:30 and generally comports with the State's electric
utility restructuring policies in RSA 374-F. The Commission
does not address in this order whether NEP, or its
affiliated New Hampshire utility, Granite State Electric
Company (GSEC), have adequately mitigated any stranded costs
which might be borne by GSEC's ratepayers; however, the
Commission finds that NEP utilized a reasonable market
procedure to quantify any such costs. In addition to the
proposed transfer of generation assets, this order approves
several incidental requests by NEP. Specifically, the
Commission grants NEP's request for authority to issue up to
$100 million in long-term securities through December 31,
2000 for the purpose of funding potential payment
obligations to USGenNE which are part of the divestiture
transaction. The Commission also makes findings which will
enable USGenNE to acquire NEP's generating assets without
becoming subject to the Public Utility Holding Company Act
of 1935 (PUHCA), 15 U.S.C. 79 et seq.
II. PROCEDURAL HISTORY
On December 8, 1997, NEP filed a petition
requesting, inter alia, permission under RSA 374:30 to
transfer its New Hampshire hydroelectric facilities to
USGenNE in conjunction with a proposed sale of most of NEP's
other non-nuclear generating assets and unit entitlements.
In the same filing, NEP has also requested authority under
RSA 369:1 to issue long-term debt to fund certain contingent
obligations as part of the aforementioned transaction. NEP
also seeks certain "eligible facilities" findings pursuant
to PUHCA, 15 U.S.C. 79 et seq.
The Commission initiated this proceeding by an
order of notice issued on January 6, 1998. A prehearing
conference was held on January 22, 1998.
In Order No. 22,849 (February 17, 1998), the
Commission granted timely requests for intervention by the
following entities: the Town of Littleton, New Hampshire
(Littleton); the Conservation Law Foundation (CLF); the
Governor's Office of Energy and Community Services (ECS);
USGenNE; the Business and Industry Association of New
Hampshire (BIA); Enron Energy Services Company (Enron); and
the Retail Merchants Association of New Hampshire (RMA). In
the same order, the Commission directed Granite State
Electric Company (GSEC) to enter an appearance in this
docket.
In Order No. 22,885 (March 30, 1998), the
Commission granted requests for confidential treatment filed
by NEP on February 13, 1998, March 4, 1998 and March 24,
1998.
In Order No. 22,886 (March 31, 1998), the
Commission approved a stipulation filed by NEP and GSEC, and
supported by several other parties, concerning the scope of
this docket in relation to DR 98-012.
Evidentiary hearings were held on March 24-26 and
April 1-2, 1998. The following parties appeared and
presented testimony during the hearings: NEP, Enron, ECS,
and OCA. Post-hearing briefs were filed by NEP, Enron,
USGenNE, ECS, and OCA on April 17, 1998. Each of the
foregoing parties except USGenNE also filed reply briefs on
April 24, 1998.
The Commission deliberated this matter at its June
15, 1998 public meeting.
III. POSITIONS OF THE PARTIES AND STAFF
A. NEP
1. Background
NEP is a Massachusetts corporation and a
wholly-owned subsidiary of the New England Electric System
(NEES); it owns and operates generation and transmission
facilities throughout Northern New England, including New
Hampshire. NEP provides wholesale requirements service to
four affiliated retail electric utilities, including GSEC.
NEP and USGenNE have entered into a series of
interrelated agreements pursuant to which NEP has agreed to
sell, and USGenNE has agreed to purchase, substantially all
of NEP's non-nuclear generation assets and approximately
1,100 MW of power procured by NEP under long-term contracts
with independent power producers and non-utility generators.
These agreements followed a competitive bidding process
which NEP initiated during March, 1997 to comply with the
terms of a retail electric restructuring settlement reached
in Massachusetts with various state officials, consumer
groups and environmental organizations. Exhibit 3, p. 6.
NEP states that the instant transaction with USGenNE is a
fundamental element in the corporate restructuring of NEES
in response to state and regional policies to implement
retail choice for electric customers.
NEP requests approvals and findings in three
areas. First, NEP seeks authority pursuant to RSA 374:30 to
transfer ownership of its hydro electric facilities which
are located, in whole or in part, within the State of New
Hampshire. Second, NEP seeks authority pursuant to RSA
369:1 to issue up to $100 million in long-term debt to
finance possible payment obligations to USGenNE in the event
that NEP is able to obtain a release from its obligations
under the power contracts as part of the proposed
transaction with USGenNE. Finally, NEP requests certain
"eligible facilities" findings pursuant to Section 32 of
PUHCA, 15 U.S.C. 79z-5a, and the implementing regulations
of the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), 18
C.F.R. 365.3. Below, we briefly summarize NEP's position
with respect to the foregoing requests.
2. Asset Transfer
NEP contends that the proposed asset transfer to
USGenNE exceeds the public good standard of RSA 374:30
because it will result in substantial benefits for the State
and its electric customers. According to NEP, the
transaction will disaggregate NEP's generation and
transmission facilities, thereby reducing or eliminating
NEP's vertical market power. NEP further argues that the
transfer will mitigate horizontal market power by reducing
the concentration of generation in the New England market.
NEP states that the proposed transaction will relieve it of
long-term obligations under its above-market power contracts
and fuel transportation contracts, which will:
...reduce NEP's share of stranded costs
attributable to [GSEC] by more than half (from
$130 million to $57 million, for a first year
reduction in stranded cost charges from 2.8
cents/kWh to 1.4 cents/kWh under the schedule
proposed in Docket No. DR 98-012). Regardless of
whether the Commission finds the mitigation from
the sale insufficient or rejects recovery of some
stranded costs in Docket No. DR 98-012, such
mitigation nevertheless reduces [GSEC's] overall
stranded cost obligation, and therefore is in the
public good.
Initial Brief at 7-8 (citations omitted). NEP points out
that it has agreed to pass through, on a wholesale basis,
GSEC's share of the savings associated with the proposed
divestiture even if retail choice is delayed for GSEC's
customers. Id. at 8.
In addition to cost savings, NEP asserts that the
transfer will also produce environmental and conservation
benefits because USGenNE has agreed to honor certain
commitments related to the relicensing of the Fifteen Mile
Falls Project located in the Upper Connecticut River area of
New Hampshire and Vermont. NEP alleges other miscellaneous
benefits from the proposed transaction, including (a) a
commitment by USGenNE to honor several tax stabilization
agreements negotiated with three New Hampshire communities,
(b) an $85 million payment by USGenNE above the $1.59
billion purchase price to fund agreements with labor unions
representing NEP employees affected by industry
restructuring, and (c) possible tax revenues to the State in
excess of $4 million as a result of the transaction.
3. Request for Eligible Facilities Findings
NEP requests that the Commission make certain
"eligible facilities" findings under Section 32 of PUHCA and
the pertinent regulations of the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission (FERC), 18 C.F.R. 365.3. NEP states that such
findings are necessary to enable USGenNE to acquire NEP's
generating assets without becoming subject to PUHCA, which
is a condition of the proposed transaction. NEP states that
the Commission must make eligible facilities findings with
respect to all of the generating facilities which are being
sold to USGenNE, even those located outside of New
Hampshire. In addition, NEP seeks the same findings
relative to its generating assets which are not part of the
USGenNE transaction. A list of all of the facilities and
entitlements for which eligible facilities findings are
sought is located in Exhibit NEP-3 at MEJ-3.
4. Request for Financing Authority
NEP seeks authority to issue up to $100 million in
long-term securities through December 31, 2000 to fund
contingent liabilities, referred to as "Trigger Payments,"
detailed in the Amended IPP Contracts Transfer Agreement
(IPP Agreement). See, Exhibit NEP-4 (Book 6, pp.6-14).
According to NEP, the IPP Agreement requires NEP and USGenNE
to work cooperatively to transfer or assign (to USGenNE)
each of NEP's existing power contracts, or to otherwise
reduce or terminate these obligations. NEP asserts that the
Trigger Payments "would be used to achieve economic savings
for customers." Initial Brief at 13-14. NEP has also
agreed to cap the financing rate at 250 basis points above
the rate for 30-year Treasury Bills. According to NEP, that
cap would currently yield a rate below nine percent.
B. USGenNE
USGenNE is an indirect wholly-owned subsidiary of
PG&E Corporation, an exempt public utility holding company
under section 3(a)(1) of PUHCA. It presented no testimony
but submitted a post-hearing brief which addressed the
testimony by the OCA regarding horizontal market power
issues. Specifically, USGenNE alleges that the OCA's
recommendations would require the Commission to regulate the
interstate wholesale electricity market which is within the
FERC's exclusive jurisdiction. Also, USGenNE contends that
the OCA's recommendations are inconsistent with state law
because it would require the Commission to regulate an
industry (the wholesale generation market) which is not a
natural monopoly.
C. Enron
Enron argues that NEP's petition should be
rejected or, alternatively, that NEP and USGenNE should be
required to "restructure" the proposed transaction in a
manner that maximizes ratepayer benefits. Enron claims that
the NEP-USGenNE proposal is the product of a flawed auction
which produced unsatisfactory results compared to other
recent asset sales. According to Enron, the proposed
transaction "is a far better deal for NEES shareholders than
for ratepayers." Initial Brief at 4.
During the hearing, Enron presented the expert
testimony of Richard Levitan who opined that the auction was
flawed in two respects, causing NEP's assets to be
significantly undervalued: first, NEP should not have
combined the sale of its generating assets with the
assumption of its above-market purchase power agreements;
and second, the wholesale "backstop obligation" requires
USGenNE to sell wholesale power to NEP's retail affiliates
at below-market rates. According to Mr. Levitan, the
inclusion of a backstop as a bidding requirement
significantly depressed the asset value produced by the
auction. Mr. Levitan testified that, overall, the results
of the proposed divestiture are unsatisfactory when compared
to those achieved in other recent transactions in New
England and elsewhere. See Exhibit 11, p. 7 ("By any
reasonable standard other than appreciation of stockholder
equity, NEES' divestiture produces by far the worst
results...The injury to NEES' ratepayers is heightened by
the harm which befalls the competitive market under the
structure of the [t]ransaction.").
Enron notes that NEP characterizes the transaction
as a $1.59 billion asset sale despite the fact that NEP will
become obligated to "repay" USGenNE $1.2 billion over a
ten-year period. This obligation is embodied in the PPA
Transfer Agreement and it requires NEP to make annual
contributions of between $150 million and $170 million to
fulfill its wholesale power contracts. According to Enron,
after this obligation is recognized, the net proceeds to NEP
resulting from the asset sale amount to only $400 million.
This adjustment yields a market-to-book ratio of between
0.62 to 0.95 which is far below the results obtained in
other recent assets sales.
D. OCA
The OCA argues that the Commission's decision in
this case should be decided simultaneously with the GSEC
settlement in DR 98-012. According to the OCA, the record
in this proceeding is inadequate to approve NEP's petition.
Alternatively, the OCA recommends that the Commission
condition any approval of the transfer by prohibiting
USGenNE from owning any additional capacity in New England
after the transaction with NEP unless it shows that New
Hampshire ratepayers will not be harmed.
The OCA asserts that several aspects of the
proposed transfer are potentially anti-competitive; namely,
the "backstop" provision in the Asset Purchase Agreement
which could enable USGenNE to gain a market advantage and
cause competitors to abandon the market and the potential
for cross-subsidization between USGenNE's wholesale
operations and retail sales. The OCA also presented expert
testimony concerning the potential for horizontal market
power after the proposed transfer. According to the OCA,
the Commission has the duty and obligation to ensure that
USGenNE will not possess horizontal market power as a result
of the transaction.
E. ECS
ECS articulates three reasons for supporting the
proposed transfer. First, ECS states that the transfer will
promote the Legislature's objective to introduce competition
in the electric industry. Second, ECS opines that the
proposed transaction "provides GSEC with an exceptional
opportunity to mitigate its stranded costs." Finally,
according to ECS, the transfer "guarantees that the citizens
of New Hampshire will enjoy significant environmental
benefits." Exhibit ECS-1, p. 2.
ECS claims further that the proposed transaction
will achieve "the actual separation of substantially all of
[NEP's] non-nuclear generation from its transmission and
distribution...while NEP attempts to divest its remaining
generating facilities, these assets will remain functionally
separated from GSE[C]." Id. at 3. In addition, ECS argues
that the proposed transaction will promote competition by
expanding the number of participants in the New England
power market. ECS also rejects Enron's arguments regarding
the alleged diminution in asset value due to the inclusion
of the backstop obligation in the auction.
ECS takes no position on NEP's request for
financing authority and notes that Commission approval of
that aspect of NEP's filing is not essential for NEP and
USGenNE to complete the proposed transaction.
Finally, ECS urges prompt approval of the proposed
transaction because, according to ECS, every month of delay
costs GSEC's ratepayers $600,000 in potential savings that
would otherwise be realized. According to ECS, regardless
of the outcome of the GSEC settlement proceeding, the
transfer will ensure approximately 17 percent lower
electricity prices for GSEC's customers.
IV. COMMISSION ANALYSIS
We find that NEP's proposed transaction with
USGenNE meets the public good standard in RSA 374:30 and is
generally consistent with the restructuring policies in RSA
374-F. As set forth below, we also grant NEP's related
requests for financing authority and "eligible facilities"
findings. The foregoing approvals are premised upon one
condition: namely that USGenNE agrees to offer transition
service to GSEC under terms and conditions which are
consistent with our decision in DR 98-012.
A. Preliminary Observations
NEP and several other parties urge the Commission
to expeditiously approve the divestiture transaction,
irrespective of the outcome of GSEC's settlement proposal in
docket DR 98-012, because such approval will purportedly
lead to lower rates for GSEC's retail customers. We point
out, however, that NEP agreed in the instant proceeding to
"pass through" the divestiture savings to GSEC's ratepayers
only if GSEC (and GSEC's retail customers) agreed to pay
NEP's claimed stranded costs before any review of those
costs was undertaken by this Commission. In fact, NEP's
original filing in this case was premised upon an assumption
that we would approve GSEC's retail restructuring proposal.
During the hearing, NEP agreed to flow through the savings
resulting from the transaction even if the retail settlement
was not approved prior to the divestiture transaction. Under
both possible scenarios (retail access versus no retail
access), however, NEP committed to allow GSEC's retail
ratepayers to benefit from the transaction only if GSEC paid
its fully allocated share of NEP's stranded costs via a
"Contract Termination Charge" (CTC). We make this
observation because NEP and several other parties have
alleged that any delay in approving the proposed divestiture
"costs" GSEC's customers $600,000 per month in rate
savings. It is primarily our concern in this area that led
us to delay issuing this order until such time as we
addressed GSEC's retail restructuring settlement in DR
98-012.
B. Scope of Proceeding
The scoping stipulation which we approved in Order
No. 22,886 purported to uncouple the issues to be considered
in this proceeding from those which needed to be addressed
in the retail settlement docket. As noted above, however,
it is clear that we cannot simply disregard those aspects of
the proposed transaction which bear directly on issues
relating to retail competition, including NEP's claimed
entitlement to stranded cost recovery. It would be
inconsistent with our statutory responsibilities to evaluate
NEP's petition in this case without regard for the extent to
which an unconditional approval might impair our ability to
implement retail competition for GSEC's customers consistent
with RSA 374-F. This comports with the scoping stipulation
which provides that an issue appropriately addressed within
this docket is "the consistency of the transfer...with RSA
374-F and the Commission's policy on restructuring."
Scoping Stipulation, p. 2.
C. Authority to Transfer Facilities Pursuant to RSA
374:30
1. Standard of Review
Pursuant to RSA 374:30, the Commission may
authorize NEP to sell its New Hampshire-based hydro
facilities to USGenNE if we find that the proposed transfer
is in the public good. The Commission has historically
applied a "no harm" standard when evaluating requests to
transfer utility assets. See Grafton County Electric Light
& Power Co. v. State, 77 N.H. 539 (1915); see also, Re
Hampton Water Works Company, Inc., 80 N.H.P.U.C. 468, 473
(1995) ("[O]ur obligation is to ensure that the interests of
ratepayers are balanced against the right of shareholders to
be free of regulation which unreasonably restrains
legitimate corporate activities."). Under the no harm test,
the NEP-USGenNE transaction should be approved unless we
find that it will have an adverse impact on the public.
Id.; Eastern Utilities Associates, 76 N.H.P.U.C. 236, (252)
(1991). This case involves somewhat different
considerations than past utility asset sales because it must
be assessed in the context of RSA 374-F. Accordingly, we
conclude that the appropriate standard for evaluating NEP's
petition is twofold. First, NEP must meet the traditional
"no harm" test by showing that the proposed transaction does
not adversely affect the public interest. Re Eastern
Utilities Associates, 76 NH PUC 236, 252 (1991). Assuming
that NEP meets the "no harm" standard, it must also show
that the transaction is generally consistent with RSA 374-F
and, in particular, with GSEC's obligation to mitigate
stranded costs. See, RSA 374-F:3, XII(b); see also,
Restructuring New Hampshire's Electric Utility Industry:
Final Plan, pp. 54-57 (February 28, 1997).
2. Discussion
We find that the divestiture meets the no harm
standard in that it will not lead to any adverse
consequences for GSEC's ratepayers or other third parties.
This is primarily because NEP agreed to freeze its wholesale
rates for customers who do not take service under
alternative rate schedules. Under those circumstances, NEP
assumed the risk that it would be forced to procure
replacement power at costs which are higher than its current
generation portfolio. See New England Power Company, et
al., 82 FERC 61,179 (1998).
We also agree that the transaction promotes the
policy objectives of RSA 374-F, although several aspects of
NEP's filing warrant discussion.
First, NEP and others have mistakenly asserted
that the proposed transaction will eliminate or reduce
vertical market power in a retail access environment. The
transaction involves wholesale, not retail, unbundling. NEP
is already required by FERC to functionally unbundle its
wholesale generation and transmission services. The
proposed transaction with USGenNE takes that policy one step
further by divesting generation assets which are allocated
under various wholesale arrangements. The vertical
disaggregation required by RSA 374-F relates to retail
services, i.e., those provided by GSEC. The instant
proposal does not require GSEC to unbundle its retail
services; on the contrary, it contemplates that GSEC will
continue to provide bundled service by purchasing wholesale
"backstop" service from USGenNE. Nonetheless, we find that
NEP's proposed divestiture is consistent with RSA 374-F to
the extent that New Hampshire law supports FERC's
unbundling policies and the evolution of a competitive
wholesale market. See RSA 374-F:1 ("[T]he development of
competitive market for wholesale and retail electricity are
key elements in a restructured industry..."). NEP also asserts that the proposed divestiture will
reduce the stranded costs which are "attributable" to GSEC
by more than half, from $130 million to $57 million. This
proposition assumes that GSEC is legally obligated to pay
its allocated share of NEP's stranded costs which result
from the introduction of retail access in GSEC's service
territory. Although we have serious questions about whether
GSEC has any such obligation in light of the FERC's decision
on the contract between PSNH and the New Hampshire Electric
Cooperative, Inc., we believe that NEP implemented a
reasonable market process to quantify and mitigate stranded
costs consistent with RSA 374-F. We find
particularly compelling the fact that not one party has
challenged the bidding procedures employed by NEP. We agree
with NEP's statement that the "best evidence of value is the
price actually paid by a willing buyer to a willing seller
after a full, fair and open sales process." NEP Initial
Brief, p. 11. No evidence was presented which suggests that
the bidding process was inequitable or that bidders were
denied an opportunity to access all relevant data. In fact,
Enron acknowledged that it did not contest the fairness or
equity of the process from the bidders' standpoint.
According to several parties, NEP's decision to
include a "backstop" requirement in the bidding rules
depressed the actual purchase price which it could have
otherwise obtained from prospective bidders. We agree that
the inclusion of the backstop obligation had the effect of
reducing the actual purchase price that USGenNE proposes to
pay (or that another bidder would have paid) for NEP's
assets. But it does not necessarily follow that the
backstop bidding requirement actually reduced the overall
value which NEP received for its generation assets.
One of the issues we considered in DR 98-012 was
how best to ensure that GSEC's ratepayers receive the full
value of the backstop commitment by USGenNE. Our only
concern is that USGenNE may insist on providing transition
service on terms or conditions which deviate from our
decision in DR 98-012. Although we seriously question
whether the inclusion of a such a commitment would be
appropriate in the case of other utilities, we note that NEP
committed to the instant transaction as a result of a
settlement reached in Massachusetts. By approving the
instant transaction we do not imply that a similar approach
should be adopted in the case of any other utility. On the
contrary, we think the better approach is to separately bid
transition service to ensure that it is procured at the
lowest possible price. Nonetheless, in this case we are
unable to conclude that the inclusion of this obligation
unreasonably depressed the resulting purchase price for
NEP's assets.
We also disagree with Enron's assertion that NEP
should have excluded from the auction its above-market
purchase power contracts. According to Enron, the proposed
sale to USGenNE yields an unacceptably low market-to-book
ratio. As NEP points out, Enron's analysis did not
incorporate various components of the transaction which
increased the value of the consideration provided by
USGenNE. Moreover, as noted above, our inquiry is more
appropriately focused on ensuring that the bidding process
was open and fair--a matter which no party has contested.
In sum, we find that NEP's divestiture proposal is
consistent with RSA 374-F and meets the public good standard
in RSA 374:30. Our conclusion is based upon three primary
considerations. First, the sale will cause no demonstrable
adverse impact on the public. Second, the underlying
transaction between NEP and USGenNE is consistent with state
and federal policies concerning retail and wholesale
competition. And, finally, NEP has committed to allocate
fully the proceeds from the sale to GSEC irrespective of
whether we approve the settlement in DR 98-012.
D. Financing Authorit
NEP seeks authority to issue up to $100 million in
long-term debt through the year 2000 to fund "trigger
payments" to USGenNE under the Purchase Agreement.
According to NEP, these payment obligations will arise upon
the occurrence of certain events such as the assignment or
modification of NEP's purchase power contracts. During the
hearing, NEP committed to cap the financing rate at 250
basis points above the rate for 30-year Treasury Bills.
No party objected to NEP's request for financing authority.
We find that NEP's proposed issuance of up to
$100,000,000 in long-term debt, under the modified terms and
conditions described in NEP's post-hearing Brief, is
reasonable and meets the public good standard of RSA 369:1.
The proposed borrowing facilitates the proposed divestiture
transaction with USGenNE which we found in the previous
section to be in the public good.
E. Eligible Facilities Findings
In addition to seeking approval of the asset
transfer and proposed financing, NEP asks for certain
"eligible facilities" findings under Section 32 of PUHCA and
the implementing regulations of FERC, 18 C.F.R. 365.3.
NEP states that USGenNE has made the receipt of EWG status a
condition to the closing of the divestiture transaction.
NEP nonetheless requests that we make such findings relative
to all of their generating facilities, not just those which
are being sold to USGenNE.
Pursuant to PUHCA and FERC's regulations, the
facilities which are being transferred to USGenNE may be
considered eligible facilities under PUHCA only if we make
the following determinations:
(a) the designation will benefit consumers;
(b) the designation does not violate State law; and
(c) the designation is in the public interest.
18 C.F.R. 365.3(b).
We herein grant NEP's request for the foregoing
findings relative to those facilities which NEP is
transferring to USGenNE pursuant to the proposed divestiture
transaction. The bases for these findings are the same as
those stated above in approving the proposed transfer.
Again, we premise our findings in this area on the sole
condition that USGenNE agrees to provide GSEC transition
service consistent with the outcome of DR 98-012. We
decline at this time to make the same findings relative to
facilities which are not part of the proposed USGenNE sale.
Without knowing how or under what terms and conditions that
NEP will sell its remaining generation facilities, including
its nuclear entitlements, we are unable to assess whether
similar findings are warranted relative to those facilities.
Based upon the foregoing, it is hereby
ORDERED, that NEP's request for approval of its
New Hampshire-based hydro generation facilities is approved
pursuant to RSA 374:30 subject to the sole condition that
USGenNE and NEP accept the outcome of DR 98-012 relative to
the provision of transition service; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED, that NEP's request for financing
authority is approved pursuant to RSA 369:1 as set forth in
this order; and it is
FURTHER ORDERED, that NEP's request for eligible
facilities findings is granted relative to the generation
facilities which are the subject of the NEP-USGenNE
transaction, but NEP's request for the same findings
relative to facilities which are not being sold to USGenNE
is denied.
By order of the Public Utilities Commission of New
Hampshire this twentieth day of July, 1998.
Douglas L. Patch Bruce B. Ellsworth Susan S. Geiger
Chairman Commissioner Commissioner
Attested by:
Thomas B. Getz
Executive Director and Secretary